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SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE SURETYSHIP
STATUTE OF FRAUDS: A TALE OF TWO
COURTS
BERNARD E. GEGANt
INTRODUCTION
Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or
some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his
lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:...(2) Is
a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another person.'
So reads the suretyship part of the New York Statute of
Frauds, in language not substantively different from that
enacted in England in 1677.2 Its purpose was never better stated
than by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw3 of Massachusetts in Nelson
v. Boynton:
4
The object of the statute manifestly was, to secure the highest
and most satisfactory species of evidence, in a case, where a
party, without apparent benefit to himself, enters into
stipulations of suretyship, and where there would be great
temptation, on the part of a creditor, in danger of losing his debt
by the insolvency of his debtor, to support a suit against the
friends or relatives of a debtor, a father, son, or brother, by
means of false evidence; by exaggerating words of
recommendation, encouragement to forbearance, and requests
for indulgence, into positive contracts.
5
If the consideration is merely forbearance from suing the
principal debtor, the circumstances usually do not reliably
t Whitney Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(2) (McKinney 2001).
2 See An Act For The Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §
4 (Eng.).
3 Shaw's distinguished career is the subject of LEONARD W. LEvY, THE LAW OF
THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957).
4 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396 (1841).
' Id. at 399.
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corroborate the creditor's oral testimony.6  The evidentiary
function of the statute is supplemented by a cautionary one: the
formality of a writing brings home to a would-be guarantor the
serious burden of such a commitment. Finally, the danger of
faulty fact-finding is aggravated where the defendant received no
personal benefit and may in consequence be exposed to
forfeiture.7
Nelson is the fountainhead of a great compromise rule that
attempted to distinguish between cases that fell within both the
letter and spirit of the statute and cases that, while within the
letter of the law, did not entail the mischief the statute was
designed to suppress. As with many of the early leading cases,
the rule was announced in light of facts that fell well short of
satisfying it. The plaintiff had sued the promisor's father and
attached his property. The son orally promised his father's
creditor that if the action was discontinued he would pay the
debt. The creditor agreed but payment was not made. In
upholding the son's statute of frauds defense, Chief Justice Shaw
noted that while the creditor gave consideration, the son received
no benefit from it. In a much quoted passage he wrote:
The terms original and collateral promise, though not used in
the statute, are convenient enough, to distinguish between the
cases, where the direct and leading object of the promise is, to
become the surety or guarantor of another's debt, and those
where, although the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of
another, yet the leading object of the undertaker is, to subserve
or promote some interest or purpose of his own.8
This case is credited with originating what is usually called
the "main purpose" or "leading object" rule, according to which
some persons who are unquestionably sureties are denied the
protection of the statute. The rule recognizes that the evils
6 See Crawford D. Hening, A New and Old Reading on the Fourth Section of the
Statute of Frauds, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 611, 616 (1909).7 Courts have been similarly aware of the heightened danger of fraud in cases
under the "one year" statute of frauds where employees seek renewal commissions in
the indefinite future after their employment has terminated. The danger of fraud is
high when only the defendant has a duty of further performance. Compare Cohen v.
Bartgis Bros. Co., 264 A.D. 260, 261, 35 N.Y.S.2d 206, 208 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289N.Y. 846, 47 N.E.2d 443 (1943), with N. Shore Bottling Co. v. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.,
22 N.Y.2d 171, 177, 239 N.E.2d 189, 192, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (1968).
8 Nelson, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) at 400. The result in this case has a counterpart in
New York. See Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412 (1860).
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against which the statute was aimed are greatest when the
promisor acts to accommodate a friend or relative and gets no
benefit from the transaction. Contrariwise, when the promisor
acts in his self-interest and derives a benefit, the danger of fraud
is minimized, and the surrounding circumstances often
corroborate the making of the promise.
An examination of two major jurisdictions with differing
lines of development may yield some interesting results. New
York and Massachusetts represent contrasting approaches to the
issues presented by the "main purpose" exception. Widely
adopted, this rule has made little overt headway in New York, at
least not under that label. According to the New York Court of
Appeals, "The rule is not recognized in this state."9 The rule in
New York does not have a convenient label and must be
synthesized from several leading cases. And, despite the
deceptively simple label, the law in Massachusetts has not
always meant the same thing. This Article will examine the New
York cases in several typical types of transactions involving the
statute and compare the results with the Restatement, which
embraces the "main purpose" rule, °  and especially with
Massachusetts, the jurisdiction credited with originating the
rule.11 In examining these fact patterns, an attempt will be made
to keep in view the purpose of the statute-a purpose sufficiently
strong to have survived the large-scale repeal that took place in
9 Martin Roofing, Inc. v. Goldstein, 60 N.Y.2d 262, 269, 457 N.E.2d 700, 704,
469 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (1983); accord 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & CAROLINE N.
BROWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 16.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1997) ("Only
New York has refused to apply the 'main purpose' or 'leading object' rule as it is
commonly understood."). The last major synthesis attempted by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts was seventy years ago. See Colpitts v. L.C. Fisher
Co., 193 N.E. 833, 855 (1935). As will be seen in this Article, that court has since
expanded the "main purpose" exception to the statute bit by bit, not always with
close analysis or respect for precedent.
'0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 116 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(c) (1996).
" See Nelson, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) at 400. In comparing New York with
Massachusetts, I follow the precedent of Corbin, who singled out these two
jurisdictions for separate treatment in his study of contract beneficiaries. See
generally Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J.
1008 (1918). The kind of scholarship that analyzes actual doctrine, developed by
cases in identified jurisdictions, is not much in favor nowadays. Theoretical and
ideological speculation is the order of the day. Without objective referents, such
punditry cannot be falsified and humbug flourishes. This article is written without
apology in the conviction that, in time, traditional standards of law review writing
will rise again.
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
England in 1954.2
The typical suretyship case involves three parties: the
debtor, for whose possible default the surety is answering; the
surety, who undertakes to answer for the debtor's default; and
the creditor, to whom the promise is made. For ease of reference,
this Article will call the alleged debtor "D," the alleged surety "S,"
and the creditor "C." I emphasize the adjective "alleged" as a
reminder not to prejudge the outcome of any particular case. A
person called S in a statement of facts may turn out not to be a
surety at all; a person called D may turn out not to be a debtor at
all. As a further convention, I will follow the usage of most
courts and call a surety's promise "collateral" and a non-surety's
promise "original." These terms are, of course, shorthand for the
conclusion of a suretyship problem, not guidelines to reaching a
conclusion.
There are some differences, as well as similarities, between
cases where S promises C at the same time the principal debt is
contracted by D, and usually for the same consideration moving
from C, and other cases where the debt already exists and S
comes in by way of a subsequent separate transaction. It will be
convenient to examine the first mentioned group of cases as a
preamble to the somewhat more complex issues presented by the
second.
I. THE DEBTOR AND THE ALLEGED SURETY PROMISE TOGETHER
A. A Little Legal History
The Statute of Frauds, as enacted in 1677, applied to
"agreements" not to be performed within one year, and a
"contract" for the sale of land. But section 4(2) covered "any
special promise" to answer for the debt of another person.'3 To
understand the significance of the term "special promise," we
must recall the difference between the kind of obligation enforced
by the writ of debt and that redressed by the action of assumpsit.
The heading of this paragraph says a "little" legal history, so at
this point, it is only necessary to say that early assumpsit focused
12 See Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 1
(Eng.).
13 See An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §
4 (Eng.).
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on harm to a promisee, while debt focused on benefit to a
promisor.14  Debt was the remedy for someone who had
performed his half of a bargain-one who had given the other
party a quid pro quo. So, if a smith promised to shoe a horse for
an agreed price and either hurt the horse or failed altogether to
do what he promised, assumpsit lay.15 If the smith did the work
and had to sue for his pay, debt lay. Further, after Slade's
Case,6 when debt migrated to "indebitatus assumpsit," the
ordinary form of assumpsit came to be called "special assumpsit"
to distinguish it from indebitatus.
B. Applying the Debt/Special Assumpsit Distinction to
Suretyship
Continuing with the example stated above, suppose that the
horse belonged to a drayman who was engaged in carrying a
farmer's goods to market, and further, that neither the drayman
nor the farmer had ready cash. If the drayman asked the smith
"please shoe my horse," and the farmer said, "shoe the drayman's
horse and I will pay you if he does not," the drayman, having
received the benefit of the quid pro quo, was liable for a debt,
while the farmer could only be liable in special assumpsit.
Suppose, however, that the farmer asked the blacksmith to
shoe the drayman's horse and said, "I will pay for it." Now, who
has received the quid pro quo? The drayman got the benefit of
having his horse shod, but the farmer got the indirect benefit of
getting his goods to market. In addition, the only express
promise to pay was made by the farmer. No common law lawyer
would suggest that both were severally liable for the debt. By
fundamental dogma, a single quid pro quo could only produce a
single debt; two debts could not arise from the blacksmith's
work. 7 Although the early common law had trouble envisioning
an indirect quid pro quo, it came to be firmly settled that
anything that would be a sufficient quid pro quo to establish a
14 See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.6 (3d ed.
2004).
"S WILLIAM F. WALSH, HISTORY OF ANGLO AMERICAN LAW § 179 (2d ed. 1932).
16 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602); see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 1.6.
Plaintiffs favored assumpsit because the facts were tried to a jury; in actions in debt,
the defendant could rely on wager of law. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 1.6.
"7 See Marriot v. Lister, 95 Eng. Rep. 731, 732 (K.B. 1762).
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debt, 8 if done for a person himself, would suffice if done for
another at his request. So a father became indebted for goods
supplied to his daughter at his request,' 9 and likewise, a mistress
for a gown made for a servant.2 °
After making the concession that debt could arise in the
manner stated above, the courts drew a strict line. If the third
party, such as the drayman, who got the direct benefit of the quid
pro quo, incurred express or implied liability for it, he was
deemed the debtor, notwithstanding the farmer's promise to pay
for it. This was thought a necessary corollary of the rule that
only a single debt could arise from a single quid pro quo. If the
benefited party became a debtor, the farmer's promise was
necessarily collateral to the debt and actionable only in special
assumpsit.2 This rule was manifest in old strict pleading cases.
If a declaration in debt alleged that a father promised that, if the
plaintiff would lend his son money, he would repay it, the
declaration was held bad: the allegation that the plaintiff
"loaned" money to the son entailed the conclusion that the son
borrowed it and was liable for repayment. The son being
indebted to the lender, the father could only be collaterally liable
in special assumpsit.22 To uphold a declaration in indebitatus,
the plaintiff should have declared that he loaned the money to
the father and, at his direction, "paid it" to the son.23 What fun it
must have been to be a lawyer in those days and bandy the
quillits and quiddits of the common law!
Prior to the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677, the
fine distinction illustrated by the case of the loan to the son only
involved skillful pleading and persuasive testimony in court.
After that time, a line was marked between facts that were
actionable based on oral evidence, and facts that required written
evidence to be actionable. Modern cases where a plaintiff
provided goods or services to one based on the oral promise of
'8 Not everything done at a person's request qualified as a "quid pro quo." For
example, passive forbearance from prosecuting a debtor, even if done at a third
party's request, would not create a new debt. See Hening, supra note 6, at 617.
'9 Stonehouse v. Bodvil, 83 Eng. Rep. 1041 (K.B. 1663).
20 Lady Shandois v. Simson, 78 Eng. Rep. 1104 (K.B. 1601); see JAMES BARR
AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 94 (1913).
21 A surety could not be liable in debt or indebitatus assumpsit. Quin v.
Hanford, 1 Hill 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).22 Marriot, 95 Eng. Rep. at 731.
23 Butcher v. Andrews, 91 Eng. Rep. 611 (K.B. 1698).
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another are too numerous to canvass individually; there is no
difference between New York and Massachusetts law on this
point: S's promise lies outside the statute only if he was the sole
obligor.24 There are cases that stretch the evidence to find that
credit was extended solely to S if the merits are otherwise with
the plaintiff.25 A look at one well-known case from Vermont will
suffice to show how fact-sensitive the issue often was. In
Lawrence v. Anderson,26 plaintiff physician provided emergency
medical care for the defendant's father, who had been severely
injured in an accident at a place called (of all things) "Williston
Road." A witness testified that the victim's daughter, who was at
the scene when plaintiff arrived, told him, "I want my father
taken care of.. .I will pay for it." The Court reasoned that if the
plaintiff had relied solely on the daughter's promise in treating
the father, she would have been liable as a principal debtor. But
there was uncontradicted evidence that the plaintiff chose to give
credit to the father, and after his death, sent bills to his estate
before suing the daughter. The Court sustained a directed
verdict for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff had a perfect
right to look to his patient for payment, but having done so, the
father became the debtor primarily liable and the daughter's
obligation was necessarily collateral and unenforceable without a
21
writing.
If the daughter's statement to the physician is read
narrowly, she only offered to be a primary obligor and never
agreed to be collaterally responsible. If so, in choosing to extend
credit to the father, the plaintiff simply failed to accept the
24 Typical instances in New York are: Cowdin v. Gottgetreu, 55 N.Y. 650 (1873);
Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114 (N.Y. 1834) (dictum); Chase v. Day, 17 Johns. 114
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Mechanics & Traders' Bank v. Stettheimer, 116 A.D. 198, 101
N.Y.S. 513 (1st Dep't 1906); Fitzgerald v. Tiffany, 9 Misc. 408, 30 N.Y.S. 195 (N.Y.
Buffalo Super. Ct. Gen. T. 1894). In Massachusetts, Irving Tanning Co. v. Shir, 3
N.E.2d 841 (Mass. 1936); Hammond Coal Co. v. Lewis, 143 N.E. 309 (Mass. 1924);
Bugbee v. Kendricken, 130 Mass. 437 (1881); Swift v. Pierce, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 136
(1866); Stone v. Walker, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 613 (1859); Cahill v. Bigelow, 35 Mass.
(18 Pick.) 369 (1836); Sudbury Pines Nursing Home v. Murphy, No. 9050, 1990 WL
254932 (Mass. App. Div. 1990) (holding as collateral a son's oral promise to pay for
mother's nursing home care).
25 See Barrett v. McHugh, 128 Mass. 165 (1880) (finding sufficient evidence of
an original promise, although C's witness testified that S promised to pay if D did
not.).
26 184 A. 689 (Vt. 1936).
27 Id. at 689-90.
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daughter's offer, and there was no need to reach the statute of
frauds issue.2" In not deciding the case under the rules of offer
and acceptance, the Lawrence court apparently read the
daughter's offer liberally as embracing a willingness to be either
a sole obligor or a collateral one, at the choice of the offeree; all
she wanted was to get medical aid for her father. By his actions,
the plaintiff accepted the daughter's responsibility as collateral
and ran afoul of the statute of frauds. Note that the
unconditional form of the daughter's promise was not conclusive.
Suppose the daughter made an unconditional promise to pay
for medical services provided to the father, who at the same time
orally promised the physician to guarantee the daughter's
obligation. Would the father's promise be enforceable? In Joan
Briton, Inc. v. Streuber,2 9 plaintiff decorator was hired by a man
to redo his fianc6e's apartment. The fiancee allegedly orally
assured the decorator that he would be paid. After paying
$45,000, the man found romance elsewhere, leaving over $33,000
of unpaid bills. In the decorator's action against the former
fianc6e, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that a claim
in unjust enrichment was disclosed, and in dictum, that
defendant's promise might be considered original under the
statute of frauds.3 ° The dissent invoked the Restatement of
Restitution section 110 to the effect that where a plaintiff confers
benefits on X pursuant to an express contract with Y, his only
recourse is against Y, not X.3  The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.
28 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19.4
(4th ed. 1998).
29 36 A.D.2d 464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1st Dep't 1971), affd, 30 N.Y.2d 551, 281
N.E.2d 555, 330 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1972).
30 Id. at 465-66, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
", Id. at 466-67, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (Steuer, J., dissenting); see RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 110 (1937); see also Prestige Caterers v. Kaufman, 290 A.D.2d
295, 736 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1st Dep't 2002) (holding that caterer had no claim against
bride and groom where bride's father contracted with caterer for wedding reception
and father's debt was discharged in bankruptcy). Thus, absent a promise, a
subcontractor cannot recover in quasi contract from the owner for beneficial work
done pursuant to a contract with the general contractor. Brick Constr. Corp. v. CEI
Dev. Corp., 710 N.E.2d 1006, 1008 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v.
Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 516 N.E.2d 190, 193, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656
(1987); Woodruff v. Rochester & Pittsburgh R.R., 108 N.Y. 39, 45-47, 14 N.E. 832,
833-34 (1888); Custer Builders, Inc. v. Quaker Heritage, Inc., 41 A.D.2d 448, 451,
344 N.Y.S.2d 606, 609 (3d Dep't 1973).
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The decorator's claim seems within the line of cases holding
restitution available for benefits conferred under an oral contract
barred by the statute of frauds.32 The fact that defendant made
an oral guarantee promise seems to take the case out of the
Restatement rule section 110, which is based on the idea that the
provider of the benefit looked solely to the express promisor.
Finally, the case is in accord with the long line of suretyship
cases that hold the direct recipient of a quid pro quo to be a
debtor where the creditor relies to any degree upon that person's
credit.33 If so, under the facts, the man who hired the decorator
was the surety and his fianc6e the debtor.
Before leaving this branch of the Article, one complication
must be noted. It is obvious that the clear-cut alternative
making the promisor either a debtor or a guarantor rested on the
rule that a single quid pro quo moving from the creditor could
produce only one debt. This rule coexisted with what might be
called a counter rule deriving from the distinction between joint
and several obligations. If the recipient of the goods or service
and the other promisor each said, "I will pay," two separate
obligations arose and only one could be the debtor. But if both
said, "we will pay," this was held to yield a single debt for which
two people were jointly liable. The result was that both parties
could be sued together as debtors and the promise of neither was
collateral. From the earliest times, courts have held the statute
inapplicable to joint obligors.34 This is one legacy of legal history
32 Twomey v. Crowley, 137 Mass. 184, 185 (1884); Riley v. Williams, 123 Mass.
506, 509 (1878); Wilson v. LaVan, 22 N.Y.2d 131, 134-35, 238 N.E.2d 738, 740, 291
N.Y.S.2d 344, 347-48 (1968); King v. Brown, 2 Hill 485, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); see
also 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 6.1(b) (1978). Contra Worlock
Paving Corp. v. Camperlino, 207 A.D.2d 975, 976, 617 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (4th Dep't
1994) (denying restitution to subcontractor). Restitution was also awarded in U.S.
East Telecomms., Inc. v. U.S. West Communications Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 1289,
1298-99 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 500,
503, 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1246-47, 465 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918-19 (1983) (holding that
plaintiff may recover for bargained-for efforts that placed him in a worse position
without gain to defendant.); supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
"3 See Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396, 400-01 (1841); Mallory v.
Gillet, 21 N.Y. 412, 419-22 (1860). This assumes that both promises were made at
the same time, a fact not clear from the report. But see Colbath v. Everett D. Clark
Seed Co., 91 A. 1007, 1008-09 (Me. 1914) (applying the main purpose rule where
goods ordered by D were shipped by C directly to S, who orally guaranteed D's debt).
31 Ward v. Hasbrouck, 169 N.Y. 407, 418, 62 N.E. 434, 437 (1902) (semble);
Durham & Moulthrop v. Manrow, 2 N.Y. 533, 544 (1849). Only strictly joint
obligations were excluded from the statute. If the parties intended a joint and
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that, to this writer, seems eminently dispensable.35
II. THE ALLEGED SURETY GUARANTEES A PREEXISTING DEBT:
BASIC EXCLUSIONS FROM THE STATUTE
A. Need for a Principal Debtor
There must exist a principal debtor in order for the
secondary obligation known as suretyship to arise. This also
applies to the cases discussed previously in Part 1.36 Whatever
the form of the defendant's promise, if there is no principal
debtor, the defendant's obligation is original and valid without a
writing.37 For example, the subject of the guarantee may be
something for which no other person is liable. Where the sellers
of stock "guaranteed" that the purchasers would receive
dividends at the rate of 7% per annum, the promise was held
original. Judge Andrews said, "The company was under no legal
obligation to declare dividends to stockholders, and, least of all,
to declare dividends of any particular amount."38
Consider the case of Mills v. Wyman,39 a casebook favorite on
"past consideration." Plaintiff had cared for defendant's adult
son who was ill for several weeks before he died. Defendant
wrote a letter to plaintiff expressing his gratitude and promising
several duty, that statute applied to bar enforcing the promise of the party who did
not receive the quid pro quo. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY §
11(2)(a)(i) illus. 6 (1996); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
SURETYSHIP 133 (1950). Doodlesack v. Superfine Coal & Ice Corp., 198 N.E. 773
(Mass. 1935) involved both novation and joint liability. C was constructing a
building for D. D transferred his sole proprietorship to a new entity composed of
himself and S, who both orally promised C that if C released D from his former
contract, then D and S would be jointly responsible. Held, valid. Id. at 774-76.
" See CORBIN & BROWN, supra note 9, § 15.16.
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 112 illus. 6 (1981) ("In
consideration of the delivery of goods by C to D at S's request, S orally promises to
pay the price of them. S's promise is not within the Statute of Frauds, since D is
under no duty.").
31 See Blaine Personnel, Inc. v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 110, 114,
349 N.Y.S.2d 930, 934-35 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973) (enforcing an employer's
promise to pay employee's share of placement agency's fee where employee never
agreed to pay a fee to the agency).
38 Kernochan v. Murray, 111 N.Y. 306, 309, 18 N.E. 868, 870 (1888); accord
Duca v. Lord, 117 N.E.2d 145, 146 (Mass. 1954); Mease v. Wagner, 12 S.C.L. (1
McCord) 395, 397 (1821).
39 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825); accord Sharp v. Hoopes, 64 A. 989 (N.J. 1906).
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to reimburse plaintiffs expenses.4 ° The Court held that the
promise was void for lack of consideration, emphasizing that acts
performed previously by plaintiff, which in themselves imposed
no duty on defendant,4' could not serve as consideration for his
subsequent promise. 2 But, suppose the son's sister originally
induced the plaintiff to care for him by an oral assurance that
she would pay if the father did not. Because the father's
subsequent promise was legally void, the sister's promise would
be held original, by default as it were, even though the form of
the promise appears collateral.43  As an example of deductive
logic, this conclusion appears impeccable. When the purpose of
the statute is consulted, it is more open to question. As Professor
Simpson wrote, "The temptation to claim falsely that the
defendant promised to pay, if the third person does not do the act
specified, is even greater where the third person is under no
enforceable obligation to do the act.
40 Interestingly, if the son incurred a quasi contractual duty to reimburse
plaintiff, the father would be a surety. Schoenberg v. Rose, 145 N.Y.S. 831, 834
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1914). His letter would have satisfied the statute, but
the lack of consideration would nevertheless prevent a recovery; the statute is in
addition to the substantive elements of a contract at common law, not in lieu of
them.
41 If the events previous to a person's promise gave rise to a duty to pay, a
subsequent express promise to pay is binding. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 82(1). For example, in Earl v. Peck, 64 N.Y. 596 (1876), plaintiff, a
housekeeper, held an unliquidated claim for services rendered. On his deathbed, her
employer gave her a $10,000 promissory note in payment. The note was enforced
against the maker's estate, the Court refusing to inquire whether the amount was in
excess of the value of the previous services. Id. at 599; accord Schechner v. Zipser, 89
N.Y.S.2d 354, 355 (1949), affld, 277 A.D. 843, 97 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1st Dep't 1950).
Contra Conant v. Evans, 88 N.E. 438, 439 (Mass. 1909) (holding that a promise to
pay a specific sum for a prior unliquidated obligation was not binding). However, if
past services were rendered gratuitously, the subsequent promise to pay, while not
one of suretyship, lacks consideration. See Blanshan v. Russell, 32 A.D. 103, 104, 52
N.Y.S. 963, 964 (3d Dep't 1898), aff'd, 161 N.Y. 629, 55 N.E. 1093 (1899).
42 See Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 210.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 112 cmt. b, illus. 4; 4 CORBIN &
BROWN, supra note 9, § 15.11. The hypothetical sister was not a debtor because she
did not receive a quid pro quo. At common law, she would be sued in special
assumpsit. Yet her promise is held to be original, not collateral. This unusual case
shows that the application of the statute is not always congruent with the common
law forms of action. See generally 4 CORBIN & BROWN, supra note 9, § 16.15.
4 SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 127. Courts naturally confine this exclusion
narrowly. If D's duty is merely voidable, or otherwise imperfect, S's promise is
collateral. See Webster v. Kowal, 476 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Mass. 1985) (barring D's duty
by the statute of limitations; S's promise is collateral).
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B. Novation
The defendant (S) may agree with the creditor (C) that if C
discharges the original debtor (D), S will take his place. This is
called a novation, and it is everywhere settled that the statute
does not apply. 45 This is not so much an exception to the statute
as an exclusion from it based on pure logic: if the old debt is
extinguished by the defendant's new promise, there is no longer a
principal debt to which the new promise can be collateral. The
logic behind the novation cases has much in common with the
logic behind the cases in Part I: no principal debtor, no surety.
However, a different policy consideration arises here. An
unscrupulous creditor may be tempted to perjure himself into the
novation exclusion and inflict forfeiture upon an innocent
defendant who had no benefit from either the debtor or the
creditor.46 In this respect, the issue is similar to the cases in Part
I above. If courts are willing to uphold an oral promise of
payment where goods are delivered to another as long as the
other incurs no responsibility on the facts of the case, then it
comes as no surprise that they enforce a subsequent promise to
pay if the jury finds that a preexisting original obligation was
extinguished. 4' Both situations are pregnant with the mischief
the statute was intended to suppress, yet it is absolutely settled
that the statute does not apply.48 It must surprise a layperson,
unschooled in the niceties of the law, that release of an insolvent,
worthless debtor will render S's oral promise to pay the debt
enforceable, while release of a valuable security, ample to satisfy
41 See Hill v. Grat, 141 N.E. 593 (Mass. 1923); Wood v. Corcoran, 83 Mass. (1
Allen) 405 (1861); Meriden Britannia Co. v. Zingsen, 48 N.Y. 247, 250 (1872);
Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201, 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (dictum).
46 Compare Berg v. Spitz, 87 A.D. 602, 84 N.Y.S. 532, (2d Dep't 1903) (finding an
indirect benefit to new obligor), with Am. Wire & Steel Bed Co. v. Schultz, 43 Misc.
637, 88 N.Y.S. 396 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1904) (holding there was no material
benefit to new obligor, the mother of the old obligor). It seems that D's participation
and consent is unnecessary. 4 CORBIN & BROWN, supra note 9, § 15.20; SIMPSON,
supra note 34, at 127-28; 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 477 (3d ed. 1960).
47 In Fitzgerald v. Tiffany, 30 N.Y.S. 195 (N.Y. Buffalo Super. Ct. Gen. T. 1894),
C made a suit of clothes for D. When D then asked for credit, C refused to deliver the
suit on D's credit. When D brought S, C asked, '"Will you pay for these clothes." S
replied, "Certainly I will pay for them," whereupon C let D have the suit. The court
found that C had released D and substituted S as debtor. Id. at 196. The similarity
to the situation in Part I is apparent.
4' E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.3 (4th ed. 2004).
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the debt, will not.4 9
Even where the new promisor receives some benefit,
injustice may occur. As an example, consider one of the most
prolific sources of litigation: the case of an owner, a general
contractor who is under contract to build a house, and a
subcontractor. Courts have differed over how to decide cases
where the unpaid subcontractor claims that the owner orally
promised to pay him. I will examine those cases later.5 ° For now,
I simply note that all of the technical difficulties disappear if the
jury can be brought to believe the subcontractor's testimony that
he gave up his claim on the general in exchange for the owner's
promise to pay for everything." This may be another case where
the policy behind the statute is sacrificed to formal logic.
III. THE ALLEGED SURETY GUARANTEES A PREEXISTING DEBT:
CONSIDERATION MOVING FROM CREDITOR TO SURETY
A. The Debt Payment Cases
If S is the holder of D's note, he may transfer the note to C in
payment of a debt he owes C. If the transfer is accompanied by
S's oral guarantee that the note will be paid, the statute is held
inapplicable. The note is accepted as conditional payment of
either a preexisting debt of S to C,52 or one created on the spot by
C giving S property as a quid pro quo. 3 For example, in Cardell
v. McNiel,54 S bought a horse from C and made part payment
with a promissory note made by D. The Court enforced S's oral
guarantee of the note, reasoning that as the note was given in
payment of S's debt for the horse, his oral guarantee was
49 See Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412, 416 (1860).
50 See infra Part III.D.
5 This way around the statute has been perfected in Massachusetts. See
Slotnick v. Smith, 147 N.E. 737, 738 (Mass. 1925) (providing scant evidence); Pope &
Cottle Co. v. Wheelwright, 133 N.E. 106, 107 (Mass. 1921); Jewett v. Warriner, 129
N.E. 296, 297 (Mass. 1921); McNulty v. Cruff, 98 N.E. 512, 512 (Mass. 1912); Griffin
v. Cunningham, 67 N.E. 660, 661-62 (Mass. 1903); Eden v. Chaffee, 35 N.E. 675, 675
(Mass. 1893); Walker v. Penniman, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 233, 236 (1857) (finding an
implied novation). The general's self-interest tempts him to back up the
subcontractor's testimony. See Anderson v. Davis, 9 Vt. 136, 137-38 (1837).
52 See Brown v. Curtiss, 2 N.Y. 225, 229 (1849); Johnson v. Gilbert, 4 Hill 178,
179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
53 Bruce v. Burr, 67 N.Y. 237, 242 (1876); Cardell v. McNiel, 21 N.Y. 336, 340
(1860); Durham & Moulthrop v. Manrow, 2 N.Y. 533, 540-41 (1849).
14 21 N.Y. 336 (1860).
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essentially for his own debt.55 There is no denying that S is a
surety.5 6 As between S and D, D ought to pay, and if S is forced
to pay, he can subrogate to C's right against D; if D pays C, S's
duty is discharged. But in relation to C, S is a debtor for the
price of the horse, and the guaranteed note is only an indirect
way of paying his own debt through the agency of another. This
is a situation where the collateral form of S's promise ("I will pay
if D does not") is not an accurate reflection of party intent.
Indeed, the fact that D is legally bound on the note is not a
material part of the exchange between S and C. The relation
between S and C is the same as if S said, "I am going to ask my
father to pay you for this, but I will pay you unless he pays first,"
with no pretense that the father is in any way obligated.
In holding S's promise original, courts often juxtapose a
denial that it is collateral, as if it had to be either one or the
other. In fact, it is both. An accurate statement of the law is
that where performance of S's promise will satisfy a debt from S
to C, the further fact that it is also collateral to D's debt does not
implicate either the policy or the terms of the statute. In the
language of the old common law, it is not a "special promise" to
answer for D's debt.
In all of the early cases, the third-party note appears to have
been taken by C as the equivalent of cash. Indeed, even without
a guarantee, assuming it is received in conditional payment of S's
debt to C, if the note is not paid C can proceed against S on the
original debt or the original price of goods sold and delivered.57
The cases, however, have not been limited to such situations.
They have been extended to situations where the third-party
note was not regarded as the equivalent of money, but as itself a
commodity to be bought and sold for money. In Milks v. Rich,58
the holder of a promissory note (S), made by a person named
Marsh, sold it to C with an oral guarantee that it would be paid.
The court cited several cases where the third-party note was
'5 Id. at 340.
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 1(c) cmt. i, illus. 15
(1996).
17 Tyler v. Stevens, 11 Barb. 485, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); Monroe v. Hoff, 5
Denio 360, 362-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); Butler v. Haight, 8 Wend. 535, 537 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1832). Where C accepted D's note as unconditional payment of S's debt,
Dows v. Swett, 120 Mass. 322 (1876) held that S's oral guarantee fell within the
statute-a very technical holding. Id. at 323.
58 80 N.Y. 269 (1880).
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taken at its nominal value as payment of S's debt to C and
holding the oral guarantee valid. The court said:
Here the money [paid by the plaintiff] was delivered to the
defendant for his own benefit, and the Marsh note was delivered
to and received by the plaintiff as a mode of paying the plaintiff
for the money thus had. The defendant's promise may be
regarded, in effect, not as a collateral promise to answer for the
default of Marsh, but as a promise to pay the plaintiff for the
money he had had, in case Marsh did not pay him, like the
promise of one to pay his own debt, in case a third person did
not pay it.
5 9
The court did not specify either the face amount of the note
or what price the plaintiff paid for it. If C paid the face amount
of the note, perhaps with a slight discount as a service charge, it
might be rightly said that the guarantee was just an indirect way
of paying S's own indebtedness for money advanced to him.6 °
But, suppose the note was for $500 and the buyer (C) paid the
seller (S) $300. Does this establish a $500 "debt" of the
defendant (S)?61 Without an endorsement, the economics of the
transaction place the risk of nonpayment on the new holder (C);
the only apparent reason for the steep discount is to compensate
C for the risk that D may not pay. 62 Enforcing an oral guarantee
by the assignor (S) who did not receive an equivalent quid pro
59 Id. at 272. Oral guarantees in connection with the sale of a third-party note
were routinely enforced without discussion of possible disparity in value. See, e.g.,
Huntington v. Wellington, 12 Mich. 10 (1863); Brookline Nat'l Bank v. Moers, 19
A.D. 155, 45 N.Y.S. 997 (1st Dep't 1897); Wyman v. Goodrich, 26 Wis. 21 (1870).
60 Equivalence of values appears in Booth v. Eighmie, 60 N.Y. 238 (1875). C had
a mortgage on D's land, in the form of a deed, to secure a debt of D. C released the
lien, by conveying the land by deed to D, in exchange for a pledge of corporate bonds
from S, coupled with S's oral promise to redeem the bonds at par value within one
year. The Court enforced S's promise. See id. at 242.
6' This objection was influential in Spicer v. Norton, 13 Barb. 542, 549 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1852), which was presumably overruled by Milks v. Rich, 80 N.Y. 269.
62 Compare the sale of mortgaged property by a deed without warranties to a
grantee who takes subject to the lien but does not assume its payment. If the
amount of the mortgage is deducted from the price paid, it is presumed that the
grantee is the principal debtor to the extent of the value of the land, and if compelled
to pay to prevent foreclosure, has no recourse against the grantor. See generally
Johnson v. Zink, 51 N.Y. 333, 336-37 (1873); GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 278 (2d ed. 1970). Contrariwise, if the amount of the
encumbrance is not deducted and the grantee pays full market value. Here, if the
grantee suffers foreclosure, she has recourse against the grantor. See generally Ryer
v. Gass, 130 Mass. 227, 230-31 (1881); Wadsworth v. Lyon, 93 N.Y. 201, 214 (1883);
WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 52 (1934).
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quo entails the mischief that the statute was designed to
suppress,63 yet the law upholds the assignor's oral guarantee
without qualification.
4
How the statute is implicated may be seen in the reverse of
the situation under discussion. Ordinarily, the promise of an
assignee of a debt is not collateral. 65  As Williston said, "The
purchaser does not promise to pay the debt; he promises to pay a
price for it; and it is contemplated that the claim shall continue
in existence. 66  Corbin observed that the outward form of an
assignment might be a camouflaged suretyship contract:
Suppose that a father, whose son is in default, goes to the
creditor and asks for terms of settlement; whereupon the
creditor says that he will sell the claim to the father for 50 cents
on the dollar and the father promises to pay that sum. In such
a case it is still a question of fact what the parties mean the
transaction to be; but the inference is nearly irresistible that the
father is promising to pay his son's debt and is not purchasing
it. If that inference is drawn, the father's promise is within the
statute.
67
Professional compensated sureties (S) routinely write
performance bonds for owners (C) who are having construction
work done by contractors (D). One does not see cases involving
the statute of frauds in these situations, because the professional
sureties always take care to contract in writing. But it is well
understood that the statute would render an oral contract of S
unenforceable. Nor would the bar of the statute be lifted by the
fact that S's "main purpose" is purely its own business self-
interest and that it receives a benefit in the form of a commission
63 See 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 473 (emphasizing this point); see
also Stratton v. Hill, 134 Mass. 27 (1883) (holding that the statute applied where S,
for a price of $50, guaranteed the vendor's good title of a horse sold by D to C).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 121 (1981); 4 CORBIN & BROWN,
supra note 9, § 16.20 (reminding that other statutory writing requirements might
apply).
6' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 122; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(f) (1996).
66 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 480.
67 2 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 392, at 351 (1950);
accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(2)(c); see also
Weisberg v. Breidbart, 119 Misc. 400, 401-02, 196 N.Y.S. 680, 681-82 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1922) (holding that a purported assignment of D's debt held a disguised
attempt to answer for it).
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to pay for the risk of D's default.6" The disparity between the
commission and the face amount of S's guarantee is so great that
no one can suggest that S's promise is in payment of a "debt"
represented by the money paid as the commission. Of course the
case of a note broker is different in that, in the words of Milks v.
Rich, the amount the transferee pays may be "a promise to pay
the plaintiff for the money he had had, in case Marsh did not pay
him, like the promise of one to pay his own debt, in case a third
person did not pay it. ' 69 But to the extent that the payment is
diminished by the risk of D's default, the analogy of the
compensated surety is at least relevant.
B. The Lien Cases
Suppose D is indebted to C, and the debt is secured by a lien
on D's real or personal property. It was held in a famous early
case that if C releases the lien in exchange for S's oral promise to
pay the debt, the statute makes S's promise unenforceable. The
Court emphasized the fact that while C's release of the lien
benefited D, it did not benefit S.70 This naturally leads to the
next question: what if the lien is on property of which S is now
the beneficial owner? In Fish v. Thomas,7 C had done work for
D, who had a contract to build a boat for S. C had a possessory
lien on the boat. S was anxious to get the boat profitably out to
sea and orally promised C to pay D's debt if C would give S
possession of the boat, which C did. In enforcing the oral
promise, Chief Justice Shaw's opinion reasoned:
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 116 cmt. c; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(c) cmt. m, illus. 21.
69 Milks v. Rich, 80 N.Y. 269, 272 (1880). In Wilson, Van Saun & Co. v. Hentges,
12 N.W. 151 (Minn. 1882), S made C an exclusive distributor of a certain machine
and assigned to C a contract by which D agreed to manufacture the machine. In
making the assignment, S orally guaranteed C that D would perform. Held, valid. It
appears to be presumed that for full consideration, the assignor is undertaking
primary responsibility for providing the machines to its distributor through the
agency of D, just as in Cardell v. McNiel, where the buyer of the horse was paying
his own debt through the agency of the third-party note. Oral guarantees by an
assignor to an assignee are recognized as valid in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 121(1) cmt. a, and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY
§ 11(3) cmt. q. (1996). Accord Booth v. Eighmie, 60 N.Y. 238, 241-42 (1875) (holding
that assignor received full equivalent consideration for promise to redeem bonds at
par value).
70 See Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412, 432-33 (1860).
71 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 45 (1855).
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If it was not the defendant's own debt, capable of being enforced
by a personal suit against him, it was a debt for which the
defendant's property stood hypothecated; his obvious purpose
was, to get a release of his own property without additional
expense. It was a consideration moving directly from the
plaintiffs to the defendant. It was not a promise to pay the debt
of another, in the sense of the statute of frauds; it was a promise
to pay a debt for which his property was responsible, and which
was therefore his debt sub modo.72
In another similar case, Chief Justice Shaw reasoned as
follows: "In such cases, although the result is, that the payment
of the debt of a third person is effected, it is so incidentally and
indirectly, and the substance of the contract is the purchase, by
the defendant of the plaintiff, of the lien, right, or benefit in
question."7 3
New York appears to be in accord with early Massachusetts
law in this area in result, if not in rationale.74 In Prime v.
Koehler,75 S owned land subject to a mortgage for which he was
not personally responsible. One semiannual interest payment
that accrued during S's tenure was unpaid, and the mortgagee
(C) threatened to foreclose. S orally promised that if C would
forbear, he would pay the next semiannual installment of
interest as it came due, and also the one past due. C assented,
but S never paid the interest. The court, in an opinion by Judge
Andrews, held S's promise binding, reasoning that S "was
enabled by virtue of the agreement to take and control the rents
72 Id. at 48; accord Griffin v. Derby, 5 Me. 476 (1829) (regarding conditional
seller's relinquished right to repossess); Wills v. Brown, 118 Mass. 137 (1875)(regarding chattel mortgagee's promise to carrier to pay freight charge in order to
obtain release of the goods); Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa. 95 (1868) (regarding
materialman's lien on S's house).
71 Curtis v. Brown, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 488, 492 (1850); accord Fears v. Story,
131 Mass. 47, 49 (1881).
74 See generally Becker v. Torrance, 31 N.Y. 631 (1864); Fay v. Bell, Hill & Den.
251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (semble); Slingerland v. Morse, 7 Johns. 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1811) (regarding goods distrained by landlord); Biener Contracting Corp. v. Elberon
Rest. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 391, 183 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1959); Cox v. Halloran, 82
A.D. 639, 81 N.Y.S. 803 (2d Dep't 1903); Alley v. Turck, 8 A.D. 50, 40 N.Y.S. 433 (3d
Dep't 1896); Cooper v. Kelly & Kelley, 164 N.Y.S. 828 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't
1917); Hudson Wrecking & Lumber Co. v. Aldrich, 94 Misc. 250, 157 N.Y.S. 1046(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1916) (dictum); Kleinman v. Auerbach, 82 Misc. 436, 143
N.Y.S. 1033 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1913) (regarding promise by mortgagee);
Schnaufer v. Ahr, 53 Misc. 299, 103 N.Y.S. 195 (Sup. Ct. App. T 1907).
7' 77 N.Y. 91 (1879).
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and profits of the land during the time specified therein, and the
plaintiffs meanwhile forbore to enforce their rights as
mortgagees. '76 Judge Andrews concluded:
And when the purpose of the promise is to secure a benefit to
the promisor, by relieving his property from a lien, or securing
and confirming his possession, the promise is original and not
collateral although a third person may be personally liable for
the debt, and the promise may be in form a promise to pay such
debt, and although the performance of the promise may result
in discharging the debt.
77
It will be noted that the consideration was regarded by the
court as the economic equivalent of S's undertaking 7 and that S's
promise "to pay" was unconditional. 79 The passage quoted from
Judge Andrews' opinion reflects at least a version of the main
purpose rule. In contrast, Massachusetts pursued a version of
the rule that was more favorable to those who sought to avoid the
statute. There are cases in that commonwealth where owners of
land subject to a mortgage, as in Prime, ° orally promised the
mortgagee that in exchange for forbearance for a time, they
would personally pay the principal amount of the mortgage debt.
These promises have been enforced, being made for the
promisor's own benefit.8 ' In Prime, the benefit of C's forbearance
76 Id. at 94.
77 Id. at 94-95.
78 In Biener Contracting Corp. v. Elberon Rest. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 391, 183
N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1959), plaintiff (C) sold restaurant fixtures to D on credit,
reserving a lien thereon. Upon D's default, S, who held a lien on other fixtures, told
C that he wanted to take over the business and that if C would forbear foreclosing,
he would pay what D owed C. S did take over the business and paid part of the debt,
but failed to pay the rest. The court held that the "definite business benefit" made S
"independently liable for the balance due on plaintiffs fixtures." Id. at 393. If, when
S took over D's business, he obligated himself to D to pay C, the promise would be
valid under the principle that when a promise is the consideration or condition upon
which a third party receives the debtor's property, the promisor thereby makes the
debt his own, assuming an independent duty to pay, irrespective of the liability of
the principal or original debtor. See infra note 172 and discussion infra Part IV.
79 When Judge Andrews said that the owner's promise was "in form a promise to
pay such debt," he referred to the owner's unconditional promise to pay the
mortgagor's debt; the owner did not promise to pay it if the mortgagor did not.
Prime, 77 N.Y. at 94-95.
'0 Id. at 93.
8' See Johnson v. Huffaker, 162 P. 1150, 1152 (Kan. 1917); Rainault v. Evarts, 7
N.E.2d 145, 148 (Mass. 1937); Kahn v. Waldman, 186 N.E. 587, 588 (Mass. 1933)
(promise by junior mortgagee to senior mortgagee); Washington & Devonshire
Realty Co. v. Lewis Diamond Co., 161 N.E. 883, 885 (Mass. 1928) (holding new
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equated with the scope of S's promise-interest on the mortgage
debt during that time-including the half-year prior to S's
promise, during which S had the benefit of ownership.82 If the
mortgagee in the Massachusetts cases had irrevocably released
the mortgage lien in exchange for the owner's promise to pay the
debt, the situation would be closer to Fish v. Thomas and
Prime.8 3 But the Massachusetts mortgage cases enforced an oral
promise to pay the entire principal in exchange for brief
forbearance. If a benefit disproportionately small in relation to
the scope of S's promise is enough to avoid the statute, it may
well be said that "[a] test as vague as the main purpose rule
provides no forward step in certainty or predictability."84 Where
the beneficial consideration is regarded by the parties as the
equivalent of S's undertaking, it is more likely that S intended to
assume the debt himself, regardless of any other person's
liability. As said long ago by Judge Blackford:
There are cases, however, in which a new consideration passes,
at the time of the promise, between the newly contracting
parties, of such a character that it would support a promise to
the plaintiff for the payment of the same sum of money, without
reference to any debt from another.8 5
Where a court can confidently regard S as a principal debtor,
the policy of the statute is preserved, and S is held not to have
made "a special promise" to answer for the debt of another.
tenant to oral promise to pay overdue rent of previous tenant-main purpose rule
applied); Manning v. Anthony, 94 N.E. 466 (Mass. 1911) (regarding a promise by
owner to mortgagee).
82 Prime, 77 N.Y. at 93-94.
83 See Fish v. Thomas, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 45, 46 (1855); Prime, 77 N.Y. at 93.
For example, where S, having bought a stock of goods valued at $16,000
from P, upon which C has a mortgage lien to secure a $6,000 debt due from
P, orally promises C to pay the debt in consideration of C's surrender of lien
on the goods, upon such surrender the value of S's ownership has increased
from $10,000 to $16,000. In other words, as beneficial consideration for his
oral promise to pay P's debt of $6,000, S has received $6,000 of value from
C, for which S has given C his obligation to pay an equal amount. There
can be no doubt that any court would hold S's promise outside the statute.
SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 149.
84 SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 139. Cf. Pyburn v. Fishery Prods., Inc., 426 N.E.2d
1169, 1171 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (using essential object rule to uphold general
contractor's promise to pay the debt of another subcontractor); Young v. French, 35
Wis. 111, 116-17 (1874) (using leading object rule to uphold oral promise by agent to
pay one who had a lien on logs a debt of $285 to release lien to facilitate sale of logs
for which agent would receive a commission of $15).85 Chandler v. Davidson, 6 Blackf. 367, 368-69 (Ind. 1843).
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Thus, if New York can be said to have some version of the main
purpose rule, it is a strict one.
In the lien cases, there is authority that the intent of the
parties is critical. If we may assume that party intent is
accurately reflected in the form of the promise, then the form is
critical. If S says, "release the lien on my property and I will
pay," the oral promise is binding even though his payment will
satisfy D's debt to C. If S says, "release the lien and I will
guarantee that you will be paid," the oral promise is bad.86 Why
is this? Recall the debt payment cases discussed in Part III.A
above. If C sells S a horse and S pays with D's promissory note,
his oral promise is binding, even if he says, "I will pay if D does
not."87
In the horse sale case, S is the original creditor of D and
assigns the debt to C at face value to pay for goods bought of C.
The collateral form of S's promise does not detract from the fact
that S is personally liable for the price of the horse, including the
portion represented by D's note. In Fish, D was originally
indebted to C.8 8 If S makes an absolute promise to pay D's debt
to relieve his property from an encumbrance, he is in effect
buying an assignment of the debt for full value.89  It is like a
reverse novation. In an ordinary novation, C remains the same
and the debtors are switched; in an assignment, D remains the
same and the creditors are switched. In either case the original
debtor-creditor relation is extinguished and a new one
substituted, leaving no debt to C to which S's promise could be
collateral. 90 From then on, D owes S, not C, and it is perfectly
86 See Warner v. Willoughby, 22 A. 1014, 1015 (Conn. 1891); Lampson v. Estate
of Hobart, 28 Vt. 697, 701 (1856). 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
473 (1920) ("It is probable also that most jurisdictions would hold that any promise,
where the consideration is of this sort, falls within the statute if it is in terms
conditional on a prior default by the original debtor.").
87 Cardell v. McNiel, 21 N.Y. 336, 339 (1860).
88 71 Mass. (5 Gray) at 48.
89 See Lazarus v. Rosenberg, 70 A.D. 105, 107, 75 N.Y.S. 11, 13 (1st Dep't 1902);
1 GEORGE W. BRANDT, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 76 (3d ed. 1905). It
is not a reasonable inference that S intended to pay C the full amount of the debt
without becoming the owner of it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
MORTGAGES § 5.4(b) (1997). Nor is it reasonable to suppose that S purchased the
lien independently of the debt, leaving C free to collect both the price from S and the
debt from D. Without an assignment of the debt, the purchase of a lien that secures
it is a nullity. See Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44, 45 (1867). Upon S's purchase of
the debt, the lien merges to the benefit of S. WALSH, supra note 62, § 44.
90 See Wilson, Van Saun & Co. v. Hentges, 12 N.W. 151, 152 (Minn. 1882); First
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accurate to say that S's promise is to pay his own debt for what
he bought from C.9" On the other hand, if S's promise is
conditional on D's failure to pay C, then C remains the creditor,
and D should pay C. If D defaults, S's only recourse would be to
subrogate to C's rights against D.92 It is as if S said to C, "I will
swap my personal security for your property security." As
between D and S, D ought to pay. As between C and S, D ought
to pay. No matter from whose perspective S's position is viewed,
D remains the principal debtor; S is collaterally liable, and
subject to the statute.93
C. Some Leading New York Cases
In the debt payment cases discussed in Part III.A and the
lien cases in Part III.B, the consideration for S's promise moved
from C to S. There have been several notable cases from New
York involving various kinds of consideration moving from C to S
and various forms of S's return promise. It is interesting to
compare cases from the jurisdiction credited with originating the
leading object rule with cases from the jurisdiction said to reject
the rule.
Nat'l Bank of Cranberry v. Dohm, 19 A. 258, 259 (N.J. 1890); BRANDT, supra note
89, § 77. Note that no type of novation occurs in the case where the buyer of a horse
pays with an orally guaranteed third-party note. The transaction results in a debt
from D to C to which S's promise is collateral.
9' Anstey v. Marden, 132 Eng. Rep. 406, 409 (C.P. 1804); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 122 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP &
GUARANTY § 11 cmt. f (1996); see also Chester Nat'l Bank v. Rondout Marine, Inc.,
46 A.D.2d 985, 986, 362 N.Y.S.2d 268, 271 (3d Dep't 1974). When a claim is
assigned, "[t]he purchaser does not promise to pay the debt; he promises to pay a
price for it; and it is contemplated that the claim shall continue in existence." 9
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
22:32 (4th ed. 1999).
92 See Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N.Y. 595, 604-05 (1848); SIMPSON, supra note 34, §
47. An ostensible purchase of a debt is within the statute if the purchaser's oral
promise is conditioned on the debtor's failure to pay. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 122 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY §
11(2)(c) illus. 10. (1996).
93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(2)(c) indicates that
the statute applies if the assignee's promise to pay is conditional on the debtor's
default. In a release of lien case, a loose version of the main purpose rule would
enforce S's promise even if it is collateral. See Colbath v. Everett D. Clark Seed Co.,
91 A. 1007, 1009 (Me. 1914) (holding D's oral assurance as binding under the main
purpose exception, where D offered to buy goods from C to be shipped directly to D's
customer, S).
[Vol. 79:319
2005] SURETYSHIP STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTIONS 341
1. Mallory v. Gillett
In Mallory v. Gillett,94 C released a lien on a boat belonging
to D in exchange for S's oral promise to pay the debt at a certain
future time. The court held that, as S had no interest in the boat
and received no benefit from release of the lien, his promise to
pay D's debt was barred by the statute. 95 The long opinion
emphasized lack of benefit to S to the neglect of the intent or
form of S's promise.96 The court implied that the result would
have been different if S owned the property subject to the lien.
The discussion in Part III.B indicates that such an inference
would have been justified, provided that S's promise was
unconditional, as it appears to have been in Mallory.
2. Brown v. Weber
Mallory's failure to pay attention to the kind of promise
made by S was corrected in Brown v. Weber,97 a case that
involved the familiar trio of property owner (S), general
contractor (D), and subcontractor (C). C was fearful that D might
not pay. S assured C that if he would go on and finish work
under the contract "he would see that plaintiff got his pay. 98 The
court conceded that it would have been competent for C and S to
have entered into a new contract by which C would be working
for S. This would be completely separate and distinct from the
9421 N.Y. 412 (1860).
95 Id. at 413-14; accord Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396, 400 (1841).
The result in Mallory was anticipated in Larson v. Wyman, 14 Wend. 246, 248 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1835).
9 Mallory, 21 N.Y. at 423. The court's preoccupation with lack of benefit to S
was in reaction to an unfortunate statement of (then) Chief Justice Kent in Leonard
v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811), in which he attempted a three-part
classification of cases presenting the statute of frauds issue. The third class, to
which the statute did not apply, was "when the promise to pay the debt of another
arises out of some new and original consideration of benefit or harm moving between
the newly contracting parties." Leonard, 8 Johns. at 39. The statement was
unnecessary to the decision in the case, which was that (1) where the guarantee is
made in the same transaction that gives rise to the principal debt, the same
consideration that supports the debt also supports the guarantee; and (2) the writing
signed by the defendant satisfied the statute. Thus, not only was the quoted
statement dictum, it was erroneous dictum. As frequently pointed out, "benefit or
harm" covers the entire gamut of possible considerations, so the statute would only
apply where the promise would be void without it. See Wilson, Van Saun & Co. v.
Hentges, 12 N.W. 151, 152 (Minn. 1882); Maule v. Bucknell, 50 Pa. 39, 53-54 (1865).
97 38 N.Y. 187 (1868).
98 Id. at 188.
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old D/C contract, which would be practically abandoned, if not
formally rescinded. But in such a new contract, one would expect
to see S promise to pay C himself, without any reference to D. It
would be totally inconsistent with such a new contract for S to
promise to pay if D did not, or to guarantee D's payment. At
least as to work done by C after S's promise, we may profitably
compare the cases in Part I, where S's oral promise is made in
the same transaction as that of D. If C gives any credit to D, S's
promise is not original. On the facts in Brown, the trial referee
had found that S's promise was, in intent and form, a promise to
guarantee D's obligation to C and that all of C's work was done
pursuant to his contract with D, to whom C looked for payment
in the first instance. Thus, S's promise was held collateral and
void under the statute. The court quoted from the statute and
said:
The language shows that the test to be applied to every case is,
whether the party sought to be charged is the principal debtor,
primarily liable, or whether he is only liable in case of the
default of a third person; in other words, whether he is the
debtor, or whether his relation to the creditor is that of surety to
him for the performance, by some other person, of the obligation
of the latter to the creditor. In the former case the promise is
not within the statute, because the party promising is not
undertaking for the performance by another, of some duty
owing by the other, but for the performance of his own
obligation; but, in the latter case, it is within the statute,
because the liability is contingent upon, whether another
performs his obligation, for whose performance the party sought
to be charged has undertaken.
99
3. White v. Rintoul
It is fair to say that White v. Rintoul'00 is the leading case in
New York, just as Nelson v. Boynton 1 is in Massachusetts. The
facts in White were open and shut. S had no beneficial interest to
99 Id. at 189-90. The position taken in Brown had been anticipated in Payne v.
Baldwin, 14 Barb. 570, 571-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1853). Accord
Collins v. Abrams, 176 N.E. 814 (Mass. 1931); Gill v. Herrick, 111 Mass. 501 (1873).
It seems that the distinction drawn in the quoted passage fails to account for cases
such as Cardell v. McNiel, supra note 54, where S is a debtor to C despite the
conditional form of his promise.
'00 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).101 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396 (1841).
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promote and the case could have been decided summarily with a
cite to Mallory v. Gillett.10 2 Instead, Judge Finch undertook a
review of a few leading cases, chiefly Mallory and Brown, and
concluded with a famous synthesis:
[T]hat where the primary debt subsists and was antecedently
contracted, the promise to pay it is original when it is founded
on a new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to
him, and such that the promisor thereby comes under an
independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the
principal debtor.'
3
This compendious summary is ambiguous, perhaps
designedly so. The word "such" dangles in the second clause of
the sentence. What is its proper antecedent? Is it the
consideration that founds the independent duty of payment? Or
is it the promise? For example, in Cardell v. McNiel, the
consideration (sale of a horse) was such as to establish
conclusively S's status as independently indebted to C, even
though his promise was collateral. 10 4 On the other hand, in the
lien cases discussed above,'0 5 the same consideration will or will
not make S independently indebted to C depending on the intent
and form of S's promise. The cases thus show that, depending on
the context, both the consideration and S's promise are essential
variables. The independent duty of payment arises as a result of
the relation between the consideration and the promise.
4. Witschard v. A. Brody & Sons
In Witschard v. A. Brody & Sons, °6 an owner (S) orally
promised a lumber supplier (C) to a defaulting building
contractor (D) that if C would continue deliveries, he would
"guarantee payment" of past due and future debts. The court
102 21 N.Y. 412, 413 (1860). In White, S was the father of one partner in a firm
whose notes were held by C. The firm was also indebted to S, who was secured by
mortgages. S orally promised C to pay the firm's notes in exchange for forbearance.
In the court's view, S was fully protected and had nothing to gain by C's forbearance.
'03 White, 108 N.Y. at 227, 15 N.E. at 320.
'04 21 N.Y. 339, 339 (1860). Perhaps it is not fair to use this case to compare
with Judge Finch's statement. The debt in Cardell was antecedently contracted, but
not with C; it was originally owned by S. Nevertheless, the case fits the summary.
How the summary applies when the consideration moves from D to S will be
discussed infra Part IV.
'05 See supra Part III.B.
106 257 N.Y. 97, 98-99, 177 N.E. 385, 385 (1931). This case is addressed out of
chronological order to better appreciate the doctrinal development.
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held the promise void under the statute. As between C and S,
the form of the promise was alone sufficient to show that S's
responsibility was collateral to that of D."°7 Benefit to S will not
avoid the statute if S's manifested intent is to be collaterally
responsible for a debtor to whom the creditor continues to look
for payment.'0 8 Witschard thus returned to the gospel as handed
down in Brown v. Weber,'0 9 though without ever citing that case.
In doing so, it necessarily overruled several lower court cases
that had been recreant to the strict teaching of Brown." ° Where
the beneficial consideration moves from C to S, the form of S's
promise may or may not be conclusive on what was the shared
intent of the parties."' In Witschard, the form of S's promise
107 Accord Gill v. Herrick, 111 Mass. 501 (1873); Payne v. Baldwin, 14 Barb. 570
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1853).
108 The court introduced a misleading complication by quoting 2 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 475 (rev. ed. 1924):
"The true test of the validity of a new oral promise should be: Is the new
promisor a surety?" If, as between the promisor and the original debtor, the
promisor is bound to pay, the debt is his own and not within the statute.
"Contrariwise, if as between them the original debtor still ought to pay, the
debt cannot be the promisor's own and he is undertaking to answer for the
debt of another."
Witschard, 257 N.Y. at 99, 177 N.E. at 385. This statement is harmless on the facts
of Witschard, but is misleading if applied to the facts of Fish v. Thomas, 71 Mass. (5
Gray) 45 (1855). In that case, as between S and D, the primary duty to pay remains
on D, the original debtor. Yet the dealing between C and S (release of a lien on S's
boat) constituted S as a principal debtor, liable independently of D. Fish, 71 Mass. (5
Gray) at 48.
109 38 N.Y. 187 (1868).
"0 Some appellate cases, mostly from the First Department, had allowed
subcontractors and suppliers to recover from the benefited owner based on a
collateral promise. See, e.g., Voska, Foelsh & Sidlo, Inc. v. Ruland, 172 A.D. 616, 620,
158 N.Y.S. 780, 783 (1st Dep't 1916) (enforcing collateral promise as to work done
thereafter); Block v. Galitzka, 114 A.D. 799, 800, 100 N.Y.S. 173, 173-74 (2d Dep't
1906); W. T. Merserau Co. v. Washburn, 6 A.D. 404, 411, 39 N.Y.S. 664, 668-69 (1st
Dep't 1896); Sinkovitz v. Applebaum, 56 Misc. 527, 528, 107 N.Y.S. 122, 123 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1907); Lachman v. Irish, 72 Hun 491, 494, 25 N.Y.S. 193, 194-95 (Sup.
Ct. Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1893). Other departments of the Appellate Division had
followed Brown in holding collateral promises by owners unenforceable. McRoberts
v. Mathews, 18 A.D. 624, 624, 45 N.Y.S. 431, 431-32 (2d Dep't 1897); Smith v.
Burditt, 107 A.D. 628, 629, 95 N.Y.S. 188, 190 (3d Dep't 1905); Snyder v. Monroe
Eckstein Brewing Co., 107 A.D. 328, 330, 95 N.Y.S. 144, 146 (2d Dep't 1905), aff'd,
188 N.Y. 576, 80 N.E. 1120 (1907); Almond v. Hart, 46 A.D. 431, 433, 61 N.Y.S. 849,
850 (4th Dep't 1899) (finding original promise on dopubtful evidence);; Desmond v.
Schenck, 36 A.D. 317, 318, 55 N.Y.S. 251, 252 (2d Dep't 1899) (straining to find
unconditional promise);
.. On sympathetic facts, courts occasionally tolerate jury findings of new
original contracts where the language of S's promise is, at best, ambiguous. See, e.g.,
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disclosed an undertaking collateral to that of D, an inference
corroborated by C's conduct. 112 It is also unsafe to draw an easy
conclusion where S's promise is absolute in form; the nature of
the consideration113 and the conduct of the parties'1 4 may show
that S's undertaking does not bring him "under an independent
duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal
debtor."
5. Richardson Press v. Albright
Richardson Press v. Albright"5 illustrates the inconclusive
character of a promise absolute in form. A corporation that
published a periodical was indebted to the plaintiff who printed
it. Defendant, a large shareholder, promised the printer "to pay"
part of the debt and advance cash to pay for future work if
plaintiff would keep doing the printing work. Plaintiff continued
its work and later attempted to collect from the corporation, took
some security from the corporation, and "turned to defendant
only when the resources of the original debtor had been
completely exhausted."' 1 6  The court held that despite the
absolute form of the promise, plaintiffs actions showed that it
never entered into a new contract with defendant independent of
the original debtor. It continued to perform its contract with the
corporation, regarded it as a debtor, and treated defendant's
promise as collateral.' 17 The court concluded:
When the primary debt continues to exist, the promise of
another to pay the debt may be original or it may not be, but it
is regarded as original only when the party sought to be charged
clearly becomes, within the intention of the parties, a principal
Greene v. Burton, 10 A. 575, 576-77 (Vt. 1887).
112 Accord Fitzsimmons v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 7 A.2d 448, 453-54 (Conn.
1939). In Cardell v. McNiel, supra note 54, S's duty to pay the price of a horse
purchased from C made him a principal debtor despite the collateral form of his oral
promise to guarantee payment of D's note.
113 The most obvious case is where S says to C, "forbear from suing D for one
month and I will pay the debt." If S gets no benefit, the statute applies. See Kahn v.
Naitove, 171 Misc. 504, 508, 12 N.Y.S.2d 144, 147 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1939);
Gibbs v. Holden, 137 Misc. 480, 483, 244 N.Y.S. 10, 14 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County
1930), aff'd, 237 A.D. 862, 261 N.Y.S. 970 (3d Dep't 1932). This point was the focus of
Mallory v. Gillet, supra note 94. See also SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 124-25.
"' See Lawrence v. Anderson, 184 A. 689, 690 (Vt. 1936).
115 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
16 Id. at 502, 121 N.E. at 364.
117 See also Lawrence, 184 A. at 690.
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debtor primarily liable."18
Operating under the main purpose rule, on similar facts, the
Massachusetts court reached the same conclusion. " 9
On the facts of the case before it in Richardson Press, the
court's reference to "the intention of the parties" applies to C and
S. The only relevant transaction was between C and S and the
consideration that allegedly benefited S moved from C. 2° D's
intention would not matter. In Part IV, I will examine other
cases where S took D's debt upon himself for a consideration
moving from D to S. In such cases, it seems obvious that "the
intention of the parties" would refer to D and S. C's intention
would not matter.
D. Building Contracts
The suretyship problems presented by dealings among
landowners (S), general contractors (D), and suppliers or
subcontractors (C) have generated much litigation, of which
Brown"' and Witschard122 are but two instances. In those two
cases, C lost because the evidence showed that S and C intended
that C should continue to work for D, that D remained liable for
all of C's work, and that S was only secondarily liable, both for
work done before his promise and that done afterward. 123 It may
not be possible to address the variety of problems, but let us take
as an illustration a case where D has a contract to build a house
for S and C has a contract to sell lumber to D. Upon D's failure
118 Richardson Press, 224 N.Y. at 502, 121 N.E. at 364. Bulkley v. Shaw, 289
N.Y. 133, 44 N.E.2d 398 (1942) was similar to Richardson Press, except that the
benefit to the promisors was greater in that they were the sole shareholders in the D
corporation. The intent that D was to continue as the debtor of first resort was even
clearer than in Richardson Press and the court held that the degree of benefit is
irrelevant if S does not manifest an intent to pay without regard to D. Bulkley, 289
N.Y. at 139, 44 N.E.2d at 401.
119 Carleton v. Floyd, Rounds & Co., 78 N.E. 126, 127 (Mass. 1906).
12 See Francis X. Conway, Subsequent Oral Promise to Perform Another's Duty
and the New York Statute of Frauds, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 119, 138-39 (1953). This
writer cannot agree with the statement that the court's reference was to the debtor
and the surety. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 28, at 753. Professor Perillo
attributes to the court the view favored by 2 WILLISTON, supra note 108, § 475, but
the Richardson Press court did not rely on Williston (the first edition of whose
treatise was not published until 1920, two years after Richardson Press was
decided).
12' 38 N.Y. 187 (1868).
122 257 N.Y. 97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931).
121 Id. at 99, 177 N.E. at 385-86; Brown, 38 N.Y. at 191-92.
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to pay for lumber delivered, C suspends performance, 124 then has
a conversation with S, who is anxious to have work on his
building resume. Three typical possibilities suggest themselves:
(i) S orally promises C to guarantee D's debt to C for lumber
previously delivered and for future deliveries.
(ii) S orally promises C absolutely to pay C for future deliveries
of lumber.
(iii) S orally promises C absolutely to pay C for lumber
previously delivered as well as future deliveries.
The promise described in (i) represents the exact issue
presented in Brown and Witschard. There has been no novation,
and C and S understand that C will continue to perform his
contract with D, backed up by S's guarantee. S's guarantee is
obnoxious to the statute. 125 In New York, it does not matter what
S's "main purpose" might have been. Unless S and C intend to
make a new contract by which S becomes indebted to C
independently of D's debt to C, the oral promise is void. 126 This
was formerly the position in Massachusetts on these facts.
127
Whatever the main purpose rule meant in general, in this
context, the oral guarantee did not satisfy it: a mere guarantor
124 It is important that C has good cause to suspend performance of his contract
with D. Otherwise, a promise by S to induce C to perform a binding contract with D
would lack consideration. See Schaefer v. Brunswick Laundry, Inc., 183 A. 175 (N.J.
1936); Snyder v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co., 107 A.D. 328, 95 N.Y.S. 144 (2d
Dep't 1905), aff'd, 188 N.Y. 576, 80 N.E. 1120 (1907). Contra Abbott v. Doane, 40
N.E. 197, 198 (Mass. 1895). If the point had been raised, Brown might have been
decided on this ground. On the other hand, if C cancels his contract with D,
justifiably or otherwise, and enters a new contract directly with S, there is no
problem with consideration. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
125 This will often turn on disputed issues of fact. See Robert H. Finke & Sons v.
Sears Oil Co., 256 A.D.2d 868, 869, 681 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (3d Dep't 1998).
126 Martin Roofing Inc. v. Goldstein, 60 N.Y.2d 262, 267, 457 N.E.2d 700, 703,
469 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597-98 (1983); Worlock Paving Corp. v. Camperlino, 207 A.D.2d
975, 975-76, 617 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88-89 (4th Dep't 1994); Capital Knitting Mills Inc. v.
Duofold, Inc., 131 A.D.2d 87, 92-94, 519 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970-72 (1st Dep't 1987);
Bonded Forms, Inc. v. Morgan, 42 A.D.2d 651, 652, 345 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (3d Dep't
1973); McRoberts v. Mathews, 18 A.D. 624, 625, 45 N.Y.S. 431, 432 (2d Dep't 1897)
(lamenting the New York rule). In Holtzman v. Country Wood, Inc., 142 N.Y.S.2d
868 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955), the owner orally promised the subcontractor, in
exchange for reducing the debt, to "join in" the general contractor's debt as a
principal. Id. at 869. The court held the promise valid, apparently under the "joint
obligors" theory. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. This decision
allowed the statute to be circumvented by a verbal dodge.
127 Collins v. Abrams, 176 N.E. 814, 814 (Mass. 1931) (promise to "see that the
plaintiff was paid"); Gill v. Herrick, 111 Mass. 501, 503-04 (1873) (S "guaranteed" C
that D would pay).
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who did not make the debt his own was subject to the statute.
The Restatement takes a contrary position. Invoking the "main
purpose" rule, it validates S's oral promise to C to pay for goods
previously delivered together with goods to be delivered
thereafter "if D fails to do so."' 28
Some recent Massachusetts cases have moved in the
direction of the Restatement. In Webster v. Kowal, a lawyer
guaranteed a physician that his patient's past due medical bills
would be paid in exchange for the physician's services as an
expert witness in a personal injury case the lawyer was
prosecuting for the patient.1 29 The oral agreement was that the
medical bills would be paid out of any recovery in the action.
Although there was a recovery, the physician was never paid.
The focus of the opinion was on another issue, 30 but it stated
cryptically that "[t]he judge's instructions improperly precluded
the jury from determining whether any agreement between Dr.
Webster [C] and Mr. Kowal [S] was one collateral to the primary
obligation and thus within the Statute of Frauds, or was one
whose primary purpose was to benefit Mr. Kowal and therefore
outside the statute."'31  A recent lower court case 3 2 denied
summary judgment to S, a president of a corporation, who orally
guaranteed a lawyer that the corporation would pay for his
services. Citing the "main purpose" or "leading object" rule of the
Restatement of Contracts,33 the court stated that it was a
question of fact whether S's promise was primarily to benefit the
corporation or himself. Neither of these two cases involved a
building construction fact pattern, but only time will tell whether
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 116 illus. 3 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11 illus. 20 (1996); see 4 CORBIN & BROWN,
supra note 9, § 16.4.
129 476 N.E.2d 205, 206-07 (Mass. 1985). If the lawyer's guarantee were limited
to the fund recovered in the pending action, most jurisdictions would uphold the
promise for reasons explained infra, Part IV. The purpose of the statute is to protect
people from paying out their own money on oral testimony, not from distributing the
debtor's money. However, Massachusetts has always insisted that S's status as a
principal debtor must be based on consideration moving to S from C, not to S from D.
See infra text accompanying notes 183-87; see also Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83,
88-89, 638 N.E.2d 511, 513-14, 614 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974-75 (1994) (holding that a
lawyer who obtained a tort recovery was held bound by client's previous equitable
assignment of a fraction of the recovery to caregiver).
130 See Webster, 476 N.E.2d at 208.
131 Id. at 209.
132 Murphy v. Morello Constr. Corp., 11 Mass. L. Rep. 490 (Super. Ct. 2000).
13' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 116.
[Vol. 79:319
2005] SURETYSHIP STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTIONS 349
a strict or loose version of the main purpose rule will prevail in
Massachusetts.
In the Restatement view, the circumstantial evidence tends
to corroborate C's testimony. If C stopped deliveries and D had
still not made payment, why did C resume deliveries other than
because of a new promise by S? The danger of injustice is further
reduced by S's indirect receipt'3 4 of the lumber, a benefit
conferred by C. Complications arise when the benefit to S is not
as direct as that in the example, 135 but this rule is flexible and
responsive to the purposes underlying the statute. The New
York and early Massachusetts positions have the merit of greater
clarity, and in the case of New York, firmer adherence to
precedent.
The promise described in (ii) 136 is not controversial in
principle, though it may present a close question on the facts. If
C continues to perform pursuant to his existing contract with D,
and S's promise is superadded to D's obligation, then S's promise
is collateral and the statute applies. It does not matter whether
S's promise is to see that D pays 37 or to pay personally.13 1 On the
other hand, if the evidence justifies a finding that S made a new
contract with C and unconditionally promised to pay for
everything to be done from then on, S's oral promise is binding.
C is justified in canceling his contract with D and competent to
enter a new contract to sell lumber to S. Indeed, it should not
matter whether or not C was justified in canceling his contract
with D. Either way, D is not indebted to C for lumber delivered
under C's new contract with S, and so there is no principal debt
to which S's promise can be collateral. 39  However, if S's
responsibility is intended to include sums owed to C by D, this
can only be accomplished by a novation.140 There is no difference
134 The benefit to S is indirect in that C continues to deliver the lumber to D,
who is under contract with S.
135 An early example of loose application of the principle is Emerson v. Slater, 63
U.S. 28 (1859), where the promisor was a shareholder of and did business with the
debtor for whom he answered.
136 See supra p. 347.
137 See cases cited supra note 127.
138 See Ribock v. Conner, 105 N.E. 462 (Mass. 1914); Miles v. Driscoll, 87 N.E.
579 (Mass. 1909); Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
9 See Walker v. Hill, 119 Mass. 249, 250 (1876); Payne v. Baldwin, 14 Barb.
570, 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1853) (dictum); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 180 illus. 8 (1932).
140 Am. Fireworks Co. of Mass. v. Morrison, 18 N.E.2d 160 (Mass. 1938);
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between the New York and Massachusetts positions. 4' Even if D
remains on the job site in a new capacity and C's contract with S
calls for work to be done or deliveries physically made to D, as
long as D is not indebted for such work or goods and the only
responsible party is S, S is the sole debtor and the statute is not
violated.1
42
The promise described in (iii)1 43 is more complicated, and less
well settled in both New York and Massachusetts. If C's contract
with D is cancelled, and S makes a new contract with C that only
obliges S to pay for goods or work provided under the new
contract, it would be valid for the reasons stated above. But if S's
promise also embraces what D owes for C's past performance, it
looks like a promise to answer for D's debt.
Technically, it is perfectly possible for S to agree to pay any
dollar amount for goods or services to be furnished by C, without
regard for their market value. S may agree to pay $500 each for
goods only worth $250. Or S may agree to pay a fixed lump sum
for an indeterminate quantity of goods to be delivered by C. Or S
may agree to pay for each item $2 multiplied by the number of
home runs Bobby Bonds hits during the season. Assuming that
freedom of contract is still permitted in New York and
Massachusetts, any of these agreements is binding. But if D
already owes C $250 for goods previously delivered and S orally
agrees to pay $750 for future goods worth $500 in the market, it
looks suspiciously as if S is promising to pay D's debt. Naturally,
C will argue that the new promise is independent of D's liability
and that D's indebtedness was only the measure of S's
undertaking. In order for S's promise to skate around the
statute, the evidence would have to show that C and S
understood that S's payment would not satisfy D's debt, that
Fitzgerald v. Tiffany, 9 Misc. 408, 30 N.Y.S. 195 (N.Y. Buffalo Super. Ct. Gen. T.
1894). Massachusetts has allowed juries to find novations, on scant evidence. See
cases cited supra note 51.
141 Compare Brown v. Weber, 38 N.Y. 187 (1868) (dictum); Krider Bldg. Material
Co. v. Consol. Indem. & Ins. Co., 241 A.D. 768, 270 N.Y.S. 554 (2d Dep't 1934);
Bayles v. Wallace, 56 Hun 428, 10 N.Y.S. 191 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1890);
Devlin v. Woodgate, 34 Barb. 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1861), with
Seder v. Kozlowski, 23 N.E.2d 880 (Mass. 1939); Walker, 119 Mass. at 251; Allen v.
Leonard, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 202, 203-04 (1860).
142 See, e.g., Seder, 23 N.E.2d at 881; Merrill v. Kirkland Const. Co., 310 N.E.2d
106, 109 (Mass. 1974); Hammond Coal Co. v. Lewis, 143 N.E. 309, 309 (Mass. 1924);
Bayles, 56 Hun at 429, 10 N.Y.S. at 192.
143 See supra p. 347.
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payment by D would not discharge S, and that C would be free to
collect the $750 from S and the $250 from D." One would think
that the evidence would have to be very strong to establish such
a shared intent. 145
Assuming that the evidence shows that S's unconditional
promise embraced D's debt for C's past performance, there are
three possible ways a court might respond. First, it might hold
that if any part of a promise violates the statute, the promise is
void in toto. Second, it might hold the promise enforceable as to
the part that would be valid if made separately, and void as to
the part that represents a promise to pay for what D owes C.
Third, it might make the promise valid in toto.1
46
No New York case took the severe position that S's promise
was void in toto, but most earlier cases assumed that it could be
enforced as to work performed in response to the promise, but not
for work previously performed for D and for which D remained
indebted to C.147  This position had the strong support of
" See Fullam v. Adams, 37 Vt. 391 (1863). Under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 1 (1996), S would not have suretyship status.
145 Such a case may be Tallman v. Bresler, 65 Barb. 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T.
1st Dep't 1873), affd on op. below, 56 N.Y. 635 (1874), op. on rearg., 58 N.Y. 123
(1874). C had done work for a tenant, D. Upon D's default, the owner, S, told C to
finish the work and S would pay $2,000. This was neither the amount D owed C, nor
what S owed D. The promise was held original. Id. at 378.
146 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Austin, 62 N.W. 719 (Mich. 1895).
147 See, e.g., Newman v. Rhebem Theatres Corp., 224 A.D. 845, 231 N.Y.S. 829
(2d Dep't 1928); Windsor Constr. Co. v. Ruland, 173 A.D. 94, 159 N.Y.S. 446 (1st
Dep't 1916) (dictum); Voska, Foelsch & Sidlo, Inc. v. Ruland, 172 A.D. 616, 158
N.Y.S. 780 (1st Dep't 1916); Winne v. Mehrbach, 130 A.D. 329, 114 N.Y.S. 618 (3d
Dep't 1909) (straining to find unconditional promise); A. Schwoerer & Sons v. Stone,
130 A.D. 796, 115 N.Y.S. 440 (1st Dep't 1909); Desmond v. Schenck, 36 A.D. 317, 55
N.Y.S. 251 (2d Dep't 1899); Lachman v. Irish, 72 Hun 491, 25 N.Y.S. 193 (Sup. Ct.
Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1893); Snell v. Rogers, 70 Hun 462, 24 N.Y.S. 379 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T.
3d Dep't 1893). Other cases appear to have allowed S's absolute promise to embrace
amounts owed by D to C. See, e.g., Reisler v. Silbermintz, 99 A.D. 131, 90 N.Y.S. 967
(1st Dep't 1904); Mannetti v. Doege, 48 A.D. 567, 62 N.Y.S. 918 (2d Dep't 1900);
Sinkovitz v. Applebaum, 56 Misc. 527, 107 N.Y.S. 122 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1907); Breen
v. Isaacs, 49 Misc. 127, 96 N.Y.S. 741 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1905). Some of the cited cases
that held the statute applicable to money owed by D, allowed a promise to
"guarantee payment" to apply to work done thereafter. After the decisions in
Witschard v. A. Brody & Sons, 257 N.Y. 97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931) and Richardson
Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918), the New York courts would not
enforce promises collateral in form, even as to C's future work, but the cited cases
seem sound on the issue of divisibility of the promise. A dictum in Belknap v.
Bender, 75 N.Y. 446, 452 (1878) also suggests that partial enforcement is acceptable.
King v. Despard, 5 Wend. 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) enforced S's oral promise to
C that included amounts for work C had previously done for D. But the facts reveal
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Professor Williston, who criticized decisions that allowed the new
promise to include past due debts of D:
Such decisions, however, appear to contravene the purpose of
the Statute of Frauds since they clearly allow the enforcement
of a promise to answer for the debt of another, and the
consideration received is the equivalent only for part of the
agreed price. As to the goods or services previously furnished,
the promisor is merely a surety.148
An early New York case, not involving a building contract,
vindicates Williston's view. In Pfeiffer v. Adler,1 49 S's husband
was indebted to C for goods sold. Upon his death, S sought to
carry on his business and orally promised C to pay not only for
goods to be sold to her on credit, but also the balance of her
husband's debt. The court held her promise to pay her husband's
debt void, and stated, "A verbal promise to sell goods to a
responsible party, for their full value and on the usual terms,
forms no consideration for an independent engagement to pay the
antecedent debt of a third person."'5 °
After first holding S's oral promise void in toto,"5'
Massachusetts later enforced S's promise as to work performed in
response to the promise, but not for past work for which D
remained indebted.1 2 At this point, the two jurisdictions were in
that S had taken an assignment of D's rights and assumed his duties. Thus, S had
made D's debt his own through prior dealing with D under the principles statedinfra Part IV. Accord Block v. Greenfield, 137 Misc. 573, 243 N.Y.S. 117 (City Ct.
N.Y. County 1930).148 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 483, at 494; accord Fitzgerald SpearCo. v. Kelly, 83 A. 491 (N.J. 1911). To be distinguished are cases in which S promises
to pay C out of sums held back from D. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
These promises clearly embrace past due debts of D to C.
149 37 N.Y. 164 (1867).
15o Id. at 165. Of course, the court's statement is not literally true as a matter ofthe substantive law of contracts. A single consideration may support more than onepromise. Heyman Cohen & Sons v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N.E. 370(1921); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 28, § 4.15, at 218. As applied to the issue in
the case, it is clear that the court means that the consideration equal in value only tofuture sales, was not such as to take S's promise to pay her husband's debt out of the
statute of frauds. See also Belknap, 75 N.Y. at 450.
151 See Loomis v. Newhall, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 159, 169 (1833).
152 See Miles v. Driscoll, 87 N.E. 579 (Mass. 1909); Haynes v. Nice, 100 Mass.327 (1868); Allen v. Leonard, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 202 (1860); Rand v. Mather, 65Mass. (11 Cush.) 1 (1853). These cases were later undermined by cases in which alandlord accepted a new tenant upon his oral promise to pay back rent owed by hispredecessor in which such promises were enforced. See, e.g., Rainault v. Evarts, 7N.E.2d 145 (Mass. 1937); Washington & Devonshire Realty Co. v. Lewis Diamond
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accord. With the 1965 decision in Hayes v. Guy,' however,
Massachusetts liberalized its interpretation and allowed C to
enforce S's promise to pay for work previously done by C for D for
which D remained indebted to C, as well as work done thereafter
directly for S. The court emphasized that C had made a new
contract with S and the benefit derived by S in having C's work
completed early. The court distinguished one earlier case in
which C had continued to work for D with S's assurance that he
"would see that the plaintiff was paid."'54  The court failed to
mention two early cases where C made a new contract with S
which included an unconditional promise to pay for past debts of
D. In those cases, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
plaintiffs' judgments that excluded recovery for such past
debts. 155
In New York, the previous course of decision appears to have
been quietly liberalized by Brown Bros. Electrical Contractors,
Inc. v. Beam Construction. Corp.'56  The court's opinion is
preoccupied with whether there was legally sufficient evidence
for the trial court's finding that C and S entered a new contract
independent of the old C/D contract. Having found sufficient
evidence to make the issue one of fact for the trial judge, the
court affirmed the judgment that Cale [S] would be bound to pay
Brown [C] all sums still unpaid when the work was completed.'57
The opinions at the Appellate Division indicate that the
judgment included amounts owing to C from D. 158 If this silent
Co., 161 N.E. 883 (Mass. 1928). A resourceful lawyer in Massachusetts had a good
chance of proving a novation. See supra note 51.
'53 205 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. 1965). Following the Hayes case, M.J. Pirolli & Sons
v. Mass. Equip. & Supply Corp., 401 N.E.2d 146, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) refused
to apply the main purpose exception where S's oral promise ("I'll see that you get
paid") was clearly one to guarantee D's debt to C. Again following Hayes, Barboza v.
Liberty Contractors Co., 469 N.E.2d 1303, 1304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) enforced S's
absolute promise to pay for arrears owed to C by D as well as all further goods
delivered under the new contract with S.
114 Collins v. Abrams, 176 N.E. 814 (Mass. 1931).
155 Haynes, 100 Mass. at 329; Allen, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) at 204; see supra note
145. Nor did the Court rely on the landlord-tenant cases cited supra note 152.56 41 N.Y.2d 397, 361 N.E.2d 999 (1977).
117 Id. at 399, 361 N.E.2d at 1001; see also Pyramid Champlain Co. v. R.P.
Brosseau & Co., 267 A.D.2d 539, 543, 699 N.Y.S.2d 516, 521 (3d Dep't 1999).
118 S orally promised to pay C the unpaid part of the contract price provided in
the original contract between C and D. The opinion in the Court of Appeals notes
that S objected to paying for an "extra" item performed by C for D. The dissent in the
Appellate Division, objecting to the finding of a new contract between S and C,
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departure from prior law now represents the considered position
of the Court of Appeals, New York and Massachusetts appear
once again to be together on this issue. On the other hand, if
that aspect of the judgment was not considered by the court, its
value as a precedent is slight.
One final thought: at the beginning of this Part, the example
chosen to facilitate analysis of the cases was the sale of lumber
by C to D, and a subsequent promise by S. A sale of goods
contract is nearly always divisible, so C's claim against D would
be for the price of lumber delivered.159 S's promise, therefore,
would be coextensive with D's duty to pay. 60  But if S is a
subcontractor providing a service for D, such a contract is nearly
always entire.'61 If C is justified in canceling his contract with D,
his remedy is not the agreed price but unliquidated damages,
measured by the unpaid contract price minus cost of
completion. 62 Assuming C cancels, and his right to damages has
accrued, if S then promises to pay the unpaid price that C was to
get from D, it could be argued that S's promise is not for the same
duty as that for which D is responsible, hence not the promise of
a surety. As this thought has not been expressed in the cases,
and as I am unsure of its merit, I will pursue it no further. 63
IV. CONSIDERATION MOVING FROM DEBTOR TO SURETY
In the all of the cases discussed previously, the beneficial
consideration moved from C to S. And if in light of the
consideration and S's promise, S makes the debt his own and
observed:
[The trial court] states that as a result of that meeting a new contract arose
between plaintiff [C] and Cale [S] whereby plaintiff would continue and
perform whatever remained undone for which it would receive not merely
the value of its services, as one might ordinarily expect with a "new"
contract, but whatever it had not been paid by Beam [D] before July 26,
1967.
Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp., 51 A.D.2d 815, 816, 379
N.Y.S.2d 187, 190 (3d Dep't 1976) (Kane, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (2002); Tipton v. Feitner, 20 N.Y. 423 (1859).
160 Assuming that C was justified in canceling his contract with D, he is
undoubtedly entitled to damages in addition to the price of goods delivered, but S's
promise may in terms cover only part of D's debt.
161 See New Era Homes Corp. v. Forster, 299 N.Y. 303, 306, 86 N.E.2d 757, 758(1949). C usually has an alternative remedy of restitution for the value of work done,
but that also is not identical with the unpaid contract price.
162 See id. at 307, 86 N.E.2d at 759.
163 But see infra note 265.
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comes under a duty to pay independently of D's liability, then S's
promise is original, even though performance by D will discharge
S's duty to C and performance by S will discharge D's duty to
C.
16 4
In the cases to be examined in this Part, beneficial
consideration moves from D to S. If D places money or property
in S's hands for the purpose of paying D's creditors, including C,
then by accepting the fund for the specific purpose of paying D's
creditor, S is viewed as a trustee and C a beneficiary. 165 S's duty
to C became enforceable at law in indebitatus assumpsit as
money had been received. 66  Indebitatus assumpsit was a
magnet for absorbing such equitable principles into the law
courts, but the character of the remedy should not obscure the
point that the obligation was not what we today would call
contractual; it was an equitable property right to a specific
asset. 67 On this basic point, there is no difference between New
York and Massachusetts law.168 There developed in New York a
corollary that appears to have had no counterpart in
'64 Although D's duty to C is discharged by S's payment, he does not thereby
escape responsibility for the debt. He now owes the debt to S, who is subrogated to
the position formerly held by C. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Md., 146 N.E. 711 (Mass. 1925); Fairchild v. Lynch, 99 N.Y. 359, 365, 2 N.E.
20, 21 (1885); Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N.Y. 595, 599 (1848); Marsh v. Pike, 10 Paige Ch.
595, 597 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); see SIMPSON, supra note 34, § 47.
65 See Lucas, Turner & Co. v. Payne & Dewey, 7 Cal. 92, 96 (1857); Bennett v.
Merchantsville Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 13 A. 852, 853 (N.J. 1888); Rogers Locomotive &
Mach. Works v. Kelly, 88 N.Y. 234, 238 (1882); Blackmar v. McLoughlin, 44 A. 804,
804 (R.I. 1899).
166 See Prather v. George Vineyard, 9 Ill. (4 Gilm.) 40 (1847); Hilton v.
Dinsmore, 21 Me. 410 (1842).
Whenever one person has in his possession money which he cannot
conscientiously retain from another, the latter may recover it in this form
of action, subject to the restriction that the mode of trial and the relief
which can be given in a legal action are adapted to the exigencies of the
particular case, and that the transaction is capable of adjustment by that
procedure, without prejudice to the interests of third persons. No privity of
contract between the parties is required, except that which results from the
circumstances.
Roberts v. Ely, 113 N.Y. 128, 131, 20 N.E. 606, 607-08 (1889); see also Neilson v.
Blight, 1 Johns. Cas. 205, 208 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799); Justice v. Tallman, 86 Pa. 147,
149 (1878) (per curiam).
167 2 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 348.
168 Compare Fitch v. Chandler, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 254, 256 (1849); Hall v.
Marston, 17 Mass. (1 Tyng) 575, 579 (1822); Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Mass. (1 Tyng)
400, 404-05 (1821), with Sayer v. Wynkoop, 248 N.Y. 54, 57-58, 161 N.E. 417, 418
(1928); Clark v. Howard, 150 N.Y. 232, 238, 44 N.E. 695 (1896).
356 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:319
Massachusetts. A genuine contractual duty arose where, having
incurred the duty of a trustee, S made a subsequent oral promise
to C to pay C from the fund or its proceeds, 169 often coupled with
a request that C forbear from suing D.'7 ° Even without a request
to forbear, an exception to the bargain theory of consideration lay
in the rule that a subsequent promise to discharge a previous
duty was valid at law.1 71 The statute of frauds was avoided on
the theory that by accepting the fund from D, S had made the
debt his own.' 72 The "statute applies to promises to pay the
promisor's own money, not the money of another in his hands.' 73
Certainly as between D and S, S ought to pay; if C recovered
from D, S would be liable to reimburse D, regarded as a quasi
surety. 174  There are no Massachusetts cases addressing the
enforceability at law of a new promise by S to C based upon a
trust fund placed in S's hands by D. 175  That indebitatus
169 See Hilton, 21 Me. at 414; Ellwood v. Monk, 5 Wend. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1830). Some early New York cases applied the statute to invalidate the promise in
this situation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Rayner, 12 Johns. 291, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815);
Simpson v. Patten, 4 Johns. 422, 423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). Other cases held the
promise valid. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Greenly, 18 Johns. 12, 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1820);
Gold & Sill v. Phillips, 10 Johns. 412, 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). The validity of such a
promise was regarded as established in Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1825). In Lamkin v. Palmer, 164 N.Y. 201, 58 N.E. 123 (1900), C consented to a
sale of D's assets by S, who was taking over D's business, in consideration of S's oral
promise to pay D's debt to C out of the proceeds. Id. at 203, 58 N.E. at 123.
170 See Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio 45, 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Ellwood, 5 Wend.
at 236.
"7, See Earl v. Peck, 64 N.Y. 596, 599 (1876). In Fullam v. Adams, 37 Vt. 391
(1864), Chief Justice Poland wrote:
[T]he party making the promise, holds the funds of the debtor for the
purpose of paying his debt, and as between him and the debtor, it is his
duty to pay the debt, so that when he promises the creditor to pay it, in
substance he promises to pay his own debt, and not that of another.
Id. at 396; accord Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412, 419-20 (1860) (dictum); 2 CORBIN
& BROWN, supra note 9, § 363, at 262-63.
172 Clark v. Howard, 150 N.Y. 232, 238, 44 N.E. 695, 697 (1896) ("When the
promise in such cases is the consideration or condition upon which the third party
has received the debtor's property, he thereby makes the debt his own and assumes
an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal or
original debtor.") (dictum); Skelton v. Brewster, 8 Johns. 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811);
accord Lyon v. Clochessy, 43 Misc. 67, 69, 86 N.Y.S. 245, 246 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1904).173 Tuttle v. Armstead, 22 A. 677, 678 (Conn. 1885).
' See Comstock v. Drohan, 71 N.Y. 9, 13 (1877); Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend.
114, 122 (N.Y. 1834).
175 A promise by S to C appears in Peterson v. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, Inc.,
158 N.E. 768, 769 (Mass. 1927), but the court downplayed its significance and
grounded C's recovery on money paid by D to S for C's use. Id. See also Webster v.
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assumpsit would lie based on the trust fund itself appears to
have been a sufficient remedy in the commonwealth.
However, a variation on the familiar fact pattern generated
controversy and placed New York and Massachusetts on opposite
sides of a dispute. The variation arose where the consideration
given by D to S was understood to belong to S for his own benefit,
not to hold in trust, and S's promise to D was to pay C out of his
own substance. Here, there is no trust res and any duty of S to C
must be strictly contractual. In New York, the famous case of
Lawrence v. Fox'76 made this promise enforceable by C, dubbed a
''creditor beneficiary." There was no problem with the statute
which only applied to promises made to the creditor, not the
debtor. 177 If S made a separate oral promise to C, it was binding
under the rules stated above. 17' Thus, in Farley v. Cleveland,179 D
owed a debt to C. D then sold a quantity of hay to S in
consideration of S's oral promise to pay D's debt to C, which
promise S repeated to C. The latter promise was enforced as
Kowal, supra note 129.
176 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). Indebitatus assumpsit would not lie unless S held a
specific fund to C's use. Thorne v. Dillingham, 1 Denio 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845);
Mason v. Munger, 5 Hill 613, 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
177 See Aldrich v. Ames, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 76 (1857); Chapin v. Merill, 4 Wend.
657, 658 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Eastwood v. Kenyon, 113 Eng. Rep. 482, 485 (K.B.
1840). A common application of this interpretation of the statute was where a
grantee of mortgaged property assumed the mortgage; no writing was necessary at
common law. See Pike v. Brown, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 133, 136 (1851); Bowen v. Buck,
94 N.Y. 86, 89 (1883). But cf. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-705 (McKinney 2001). However,
some early courts perceived the mischief that the statute was intended to suppress,
and held the oral promise void. See, e.g., Clapp v. Lawton, 31 Conn. 95, 101-03
(1862); Shoemaker v. King, 40 Pa. 107, 110 (1861). Others upheld C's right to sue on
S's promise to D because of the equivalent consideration given to S by D. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Bevans, 58 Ill. 232, 234-35 (1871); Clark v. Howard, 150 N.Y. 232, 238, 44
N.E. 695, 697 (1896); Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio 45, 60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846). The
best reason for excluding promises to a debtor from the statute's reach was that the
promisor in such cases nearly always received a quid pro quo that made the debt his
own. See Fullam v. Adams, 37 Vt. 391, 392 (1863); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(c) (1996).
178 Rounsevel v. Osgood, 44 A. 535, 535-36 (1896); First Nat'l Bank of Sing Sing
v. Chalmers, 144 N.Y. 432, 439, 39 N.E. 331, 333 (1895); Ackley v Parmenter, 98
N.Y. 425, 431 (1885) (dictum); Metzger v. Edson, 25 Misc. 236, 237, 55 N.Y.S. 61, 61
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1898); see also 2 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 349, at 219.
179 4 Cow. 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825), affd, 9 Cow. 639 (N.Y. 1827). This case was
on all fours with Lawrence, except for the fact that S made a promise directly to C,
thus raising the statutory issue. The court in Lawrence granted C a legal right to
enforce S's original promise to D, thus rendering superfluous his direct promise to C,
and skirting the statutory issue. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 274.
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original, being founded on an assumption of the debt by S. This
extension of the traditional fact pattern is seen in several cases
where D was employed by S who held back an amount earned by
D for the purpose of paying D's debt to C. Money owed by S to D
constitutes a purely contractual debtor-creditor relation; the
amount owed is not the res of a trust.'8 ° Nevertheless, S's oral
promise to C to pay him out of the holdbacks has been held
valid.'8 ' To the extent that S's promise to C is to pay out of what
S owes D, he is paying his own debt.'82
Massachusetts has always upheld C's right to bring
indebitatus assumpsit where S held an identifiable fund provided
by D to pay his debt.183  However, in Mellen v.Whipple,' 84 the
Supreme Judicial Court reached a result contrary to Lawrence v.
Fox, where there was no specific asset held upon a trust, and
180 McKee v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119, 121-22 (1936); Solomon v. Boschulte, 200
F.2d 482, 483 (3d Cir. 1952).
181 See, e.g., Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Cole, 258 F. 169 (6th Cir. 1919); Woodruff
v. Scaife, 83 Ala. 152 (1887); Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320 (1877); Raabe v.
Squier, 148 N.Y. 81, 42 N.E. 516 (1895); Gallagher v. Nichols, 60 N.Y. 438 (1875) (S
accepted order from D to pay C out of funds to come due to D from S); King v.
Despard, 5 Wend. 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Schild v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co.,
108 A.D. 50, 95 N.Y.S. 493 (2d Dep't 1905); Reisler v. Silbermintz, 99 A.D. 131, 90
N.Y.S. 967 (1st Dep't 1904); Roussel v. Mathews, 62 A.D. 1, 70 N.Y.S. 886 (1st Dep't
1901), aff'd, 171 N.Y. 634, 63 N.E. 1122 (1902); May v. Nat'l Bank of Malone, 9 Hun
108 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1876), aff'd, 73 N.Y. 599 (1878); Tallman v. Bresler,
65 Barb. 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1873), aff'd, 56 N.Y. 635 (1874);
accord 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 481; 4 CORBIN & BROWN, supra note
9, § 15.18.
182 As between D and S, the duty is primarily that of S. After S pays, C he has
no right to seek reimbursement from D. 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, §
481.
183 See Fitch v. Chandler, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 254 (1849); Hall v. Marston, 17
Mass. (1 Tyng) 575 (1822); Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Mass. (1 Tyng) 400 (1821). Mellen v.
Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854) recognized the force of the indebitatus
assumpsit cases, and cases subsequent to Mellen have reaffirmed them. See
Bianconi v. Crowley, 152 N.E. 305 (Mass. 1926); Putman v. Field, 103 Mass. 556
(1870); Frost v. Gage, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 262 (1861). The same distinction was
obtained in Michigan. See Fay v. Sanderson, 12 N.W. 161 (Mich. 1882) (affirming
third party's right to sue for money paid into defendant's hands for plaintiffs use);
Halsted v. Francis, 31 Mich. 113 (1875) (rejecting claim by creditor beneficiary). The
distinction between the two grounds of liability was recognized in Clapp v. Lawton,
31 Conn. 95 (1862).
1'8 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (denying a mortgagee recourse against an assuming
grantee). Contra Burr v. Beers, 24 N.Y. 178 (1861). Of course, in Massachusetts, the
grantor, as promisee, had recourse against the grantee if the grantee broke his oral
promise to pay the mortgagee. See Alger v. Scoville, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 391 (1854).
Subsequently, bills in equity by creditors were entertained. See Forbes v. Thorpe, 95
N.E. 955 (Mass. 1911).
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where S's undertaking to pay the promisee's creditor was based
only upon a consideration provided by the promisee. The court
insisted that a binding promise could only be based on a
consideration given by the one seeking enforcement. Note that
Mellen did not involve the statute of frauds;185 it was based on a
point of substantive contract law: that the consideration must
move from the plaintiff. At about the same time, the Supreme
Judicial Court announced a corollary rule based on the statute of
frauds. In Curtis v. Brown,186 a general contractor signed over all
his material to the owner and released the owner from all
obligation under the contract in exchange for the owner's oral
promise to pay workers and suppliers. The owner directed this
promise to be communicated to the builder's creditors. The court
held that the exception to the statute carved out by Nelson v.
Boynton 187 only applied where the creditor provides the beneficial
consideration. In the case before it, the consideration moved
from the debtor. 88 The effect of this decision is seen in several
later cases involving an owner's promise to pay the builder's
creditors out of sums held back for that purpose. In New York,
this is held to be a promise to pay the owner's own debt in a
particular way. 8 9 In Massachusetts, because S's promise to D to
hold back money for the benefit of C did not create rights in C,
his later promise to C was not to pay his own debt, but a
collateral promise to answer for D's debt.' 90 As Justice Gray said
185 It is true that the defendant grantee in Mellen did not sign the deed
containing the assumption clause. As a promise to the debtor, it was not necessary to
have written evidence. Mellen, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 391. The holding of Mellen was
routinely applied to cases where the defendant's promise to D was written. See
Larson v. Jeffrey-Nichols Motor Co., 181 N.E. 213 (Mass. 1932); New England
Structural Co. v. James Russell Boiler Works Co., 120 N.E. 852 (Mass. 1918); Aigen
v. Boston & Maine R.R., 132 Mass. 423 (1882); see also 2 WILLISTON & JAEGER,
supra note 46, § 381.
186 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 488 (1850).
187 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396 (1841).
188 Furbish v. Goodnow, 98 Mass. 296 (1867); Curtis, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 488.
The early cases did not address a situation where the consideration moved from D to
S and S made a written promise to pay C. Such a promise was enforced in Marine
Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1974).
189 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
190 See Ribock v. Canner, 105 N.E. 462 (Mass. 1914) (semble); Miles v. Driscoll,
87 N.E. 579 (Mass. 1909); O'Connell v. Mt. Holyoke Coll., 55 N.E. 460 (Mass. 1899);
Borden v. Boardman, 32 N.E. 469 (Mass. 1892); see also Halsted v. Francis, 9 Mich.
113 (1875). If C released D and agreed to look solely to S in consideration of S's oral
promise to pay C directly out of sums due to D, an enforceable novation resulted. See
McNulty v. Cruff, 98 N.E. 512 (Mass. 1912); cf. Langdon v. Hughes, 107 Mass. 272
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in a later case:
[B]y the later decisions in New York, Maine and Vermont, the
application of the statute has been so far relaxed in those states
as to treat a transfer of property from the original debtor to the
new promisor as taking the promise of the latter to the original
creditor out of the statute.
1 91
There have been cases where S's promise to pay C was based
on receipt of an indirect benefit from C, coupled with a direct
benefit from D. The Supreme Judicial Court insisted that
whether S became a principal debtor could be based only on the
benefit conferred by C, and if that benefit was itself insufficient
for that purpose, it could not be established by S's dealing with
D. For example, in Colpitts v. L.C. Fisher Co., 92 a leading case
featured in contracts casebooks,' 93  some employees of a
corporation held its notes for money lent, and outside creditors
also had claims. The shareholders of the corporation wanted to
liquidate it and begin business afresh with a new corporation.
Speaking for the new corporation, they orally promised the
employees that if they would forbear pressing their claims
against the old corporation and allow its assets to be used to pay
the outside creditors, the new corporation would continue to
employ them and would pay the notes of the old corporation. The
employees agreed, the outside creditors were paid and the other
tangible assets passed to the new corporation. The employees
were later discharged and their notes were never paid. In their
action against the new corporation, the court held the promise
void under the statute. It observed that the employees did not
release any lien or surrender their claims against the old
corporation. Their forbearance directly benefited the old
corporation and its creditors. "Only indirectly was the new
corporation aided."' 94 If the case had arisen in New York, it could
(1871) (holding that a novation occurred where father agreed with sons to pay their
debt to C for a consideration, and C agreed to release sons and accept father as
debtor).
'9' Furbish v. Goodnow, 98 Mass. 296, 302 (1867). Although no cases were cited,
Justice Gray may have had in mind Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio 45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1846), Maxwell v. Haynes, 41 Me. 559 (1856), and Wait v. Wait, 28 Vt. 350 (1856).
192 193 N.E. 833 (1935).
'9' FRIEDRICH KESSLER, ET. AL, CONTRACTS: CASES & MATERIALS 765 (3d ed.
1986); SAMUEL WILLISTON, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 383 (Laube ed., 6th
ed. 1954).
194 Coipitts, 193 N.E. at 836.
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have been argued that the new corporation took the debt upon
itself in its dealing with the old corporation, to whose business it
succeeded.' 95 Under the rule in Massachusetts, this element of
the case was immaterial.
On the third-party creditor beneficiary point, Massachusetts
has abandoned Mellon v. Whipple and adopted the majority rule
represented by Lawrence v. Fox.'96 It remains to be seen whether
this shift will have its logical impact on the statute of frauds
issue.' 97 Meanwhile, it is pleasantly ironic to contemplate a judge
of the court credited with originating the "main purpose" rule
chide New York for relaxing the scope of the statute.
98
To summarize the New York position, where beneficial
consideration moves from D to S, the validity of S's subsequent
promise to C depends altogether upon whether, in his dealing
with D, S made the debt his own and converted D into a quasi
surety. It is useful to note that if S simply acquires the assets of
D, without any promise to D with respect to D's debt to C, a
subsequent oral promise to C violates the statute. For example,
in Noce v. Kaufman,99 an owner was indebted to a contractor for
work done on his building. The owner deeded the building to a
grantee, who allegedly made an oral promise to the contractor to
pay the former owner's debt. There was no evidence that the
grantee promised the grantor to pay the debt. The court held the
grantee's promise void under the statute. Similarly, if S accepts
assets from D merely as indemnity for possible future liability, he
thereby incurs no duty to D, has not made the debt his own, and
his subsequent promise to C violates the statute. 20 0  And if S's
195 See, e.g., Lamkin v. Palmer, 164 N.Y. 201, 58 N.E. 123 (1900); Kramer v.
Harrington Wells & Rhodes Ltd., 275 A.D.2d 302, 711 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 2000);
Biener Contracting Corp. v. Elberon Rest. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 391, 183 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st
Dep't 1959); Mann v. Ewing, 156 Misc. 216, 281 N.Y.S. 515 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1935).
196 Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 392 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 1979).
197 Webster v. Kowal, 476 N.E.2d 205 (Mass. 1985) may be a harbinger of
change.
'98 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
'99 2 N.Y.2d 347, 141 N.E.2d 529, 161 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957) (holding that the
contractor had no mechanic's lien; it is unclear when the grantee made his promise
to the contractor); accord Chandler v. Davidson, 6 Blackf. 367 (Ind. 1843); Cardeza v.
Bishop, 54 A.D. 116, 66 N.Y.S. 408 (2d Dep't 1900); Healy v. Brotman, 96 Misc. 2d
386, 409 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978).
200 Ackley v. Parmenter, 98 N.Y. 425 (1885); Becker v. Krank, 75 A.D. 191, 77
N.Y.S. 665 (3d Dep't 1902), afl'd, 176 N.Y. 535, 68 N.E. 1114 (1903); accord 2
WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 459.
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promise to D is only to pay C out of the proceeds of property
transferred by D to S, his obligation to D and C is subject to the
condition that the proceeds be realized. If S makes an
unconditional oral promise to C to pay D's debt before the
condition is satisfied, it is not congruent with his preexisting
duty to D and is barred by the statute as a promise to pay the
debt of another, not his own debt.2"1 If S has not previously
assumed the debt in his dealing with D, his subsequent promise
to C "would be void at common law as without any consideration,
and void also under the statute of frauds as not in writing., 20 2 On
the other hand, as stated above, if S receives assets from D for
his own use and, in exchange, makes an unconditional promise to
D to pay C, as in Lawrence, then S's subsequent promise to C is
congruent with his duty to D and is held to be a valid promise to
pay a debt he has made his own.20 3
Recall the summary of the law made in Richardson Press v.
Albright,20 4 discussed previously in Part III.C, that S's promise is
regarded as original only "when the party sought to be charged
clearly becomes, within the intention of the parties, a principal
debtor primarily liable. 20 5 In the analysis of that case, it was
observed that where the position of S depends on consideration
moving from C to S the relevant parties whose intention counts
are C and S.20 6 The previous paragraph shows that where the
position of S derives from consideration moving from D to S,
those are the relevant parties whose intention may make S a
principal debtor primarily liable.
The Form of the Promise Revisited. Where consideration
passes from D to S, it is certain that the way those two parties
regard the consideration determines whether S becomes the
principal debtor and D a quasi surety. If, by that transaction, D
201 See Belknap v. Bender, 75 N.Y. 446 (1878); SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 131.
Although the facts are unclear, it is possible that Jackson v. Rayner, 12 Johns. 291
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) may be defended on this ground.
202 Belknap, 75 N.Y. at 452.
203 See First Nat'l Bank of Sing Sing v. Chalmers, 144 N.Y. 432, 39 N.E. 331
(1895). If a jurisdiction followed Mellen in denying standing to a creditor beneficiary,
then S's subsequent promise to C, oral or written, would lack consideration. Halsted
v. Francis, 31 Mich. 113 (1875).
204 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
205 Id. at 502, 121 N.E. at 364.
206 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Williston's test for satisfying the
statute only fits the cases where the key transaction is between D and S. See supra
note 108 and accompanying text.
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has bargained to have S assume the debt, S becomes primarily
responsible vis-A-vis D, and the form of S's subsequent promise to
C is not relevant for the purpose of the statute of frauds. Even if
S presents himself to C in the aspect of a surety ("forbear from
suing D and I'll guarantee you will get paid"), he is nevertheless
promising to pay his own debt.20 ' That the form of S's promise to
C is unimportant is underlined by a reference to Lawrence v.
Fox,20' according to which no further promise to C is necessary.
Thus, if D turns over money or other assets to S and the parties
intend the beneficial interest to vest in S in exchange for S's
promise to pay D's creditor, then as between S and D, S ought to
pay.20 9 If an owner (S) tells a subcontractor (C) that he will hold
back enough money otherwise payable to the general contractor
(D) to "guarantee" that C will be paid, the promise has been held
original despite its form.210
The importance of the transaction between D and S has a
corollary in third-party beneficiary law. If D conveys mortgaged
land to S with a deed containing a clause by which the grantee
assumes payment of the mortgage debt, the promise will be given
its natural meaning as a promise enforceable by the mortgagee
as creditor beneficiary. 21' But this is only allowed where S
acquires the beneficial as well as the legal ownership. If the deed
from D to S is intended by the parties only as security for a debt
owed by D to S, it is regarded as a mortgage, and the assumption
clause, despite its form, is interpreted as merely a promise to
advance money to D to pay his debt on the security of the land,
not as a promise to pay the mortgage debt itself enforceable by
the mortgagee.212 As Judge Andrews summed up the law in
207 See Raabe v. Squier, 148 N.Y. 81, 42 N.E. 516 (1895). This remains true even
if C is unaware of the previous dealing between D and S, and perceives S as only a
surety. 11 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 1371.
208 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
209 See Clark v. Howard, 150 N.Y. 232, 238, 44 N.E. 695, 697 (1896); see also
supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
210 Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Cole, 258 F. 169 (6th Cir. 1919); Raabe, 148 N.Y.
at 87, 42 N.E. at 518; Threadgill v. McLendon, 76 N.C. 24, 26 (1877); accord 1
WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 86, § 481 (noting that for what S pays to C, he has
no right to indemnity from D). It is unclear whether D must consent to the holdback.
See 2 CORBIN, supra note 67,§ 363, at 266.
211 See Burr v. Beers, 24 N.Y. 178, 179 (1861).
212 See Cole v. Cole, 110 N.Y. 630, 632, 17 N.E. 682, 683 (1888); Root v.Wright,
84 N.Y. 72 (1881); Pardee v. Treat, 82 N.Y. 385, 387 (1880); Garnsey v. Rogers, 47
N.Y. 233, 237-38 (1872). A further example of how courts rewrite promises to
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Pardee v. Treat:213
We think the true result of the decisions upon the effect of an
assumption clause in a deed is, that it can only be enforced by a
lienor, where in equity the debt of the grantor secured by the
lien becomes, by the agreement between him and his grantee,
who assumes the payment, the debt of the latter. On the other
hand, if the assumption is in aid of the grantor,...or, in other
words, if, in equity as at law, the grantor remains the principal
debtor, then the assumption clause is a contract between the
parties to the deed alone, and the liability of the grantee, for
any breach of his obligation, is to the grantor only.
214
The issue in Pardee was not framed in terms of the statute of
frauds; the statute only applies to a promise by S to C; a promise
by S to D lies outside the statute. Yet, whereas between S and D,
S had not made the debt his own, C was denied the right to
enforce it as a third-party beneficiary despite the form of S's
promise. And a subsequent promise by S to C would be subject to
the statute.1 5 Were the rule in Pardee otherwise, the corollary
rule that promises to D lie outside the statute might have to be
modified.
The freedom with which the New York courts enforce
promises collateral in form when based on consideration moving
from D to S stands in contrast to the rigorous scrutiny of the
form of S's promise when the consideration moves from C to S.216
It has been observed that when beneficial consideration is
provided to S by D, it is intrinsically more likely to be the
conform to an intent ascribed by the court is where D owns land subject to a
mortgage but is not personally liable for the debt. If he sells and conveys the land to
S with a deed containing a clause by which S agrees to pay the debt, the assumption
clause is not given its usual meaning. Because D had no apparent interest in having
the debt paid once he no longer owns the land, S's promise will be interpreted as
intended only as an indemnity to D, by which C derives no rights. Vrooman v.
Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877); see also infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. It
had previously been held that even with beneficial consideration, a promise by S to
D to indemnify D against his obligation to C was not enforceable by C. See Turk v.
Ridge, 41 N.Y. 201, 207 (1869).
213 82 N.Y. 385 (1880).
214 Id. at 388-91.
215 See Ackley v. Parmenter, 98 N.Y. 425 (1885). This relation between third-
party beneficiary law and how the statute is interpreted when S's promise is made to
C has its reverse mirror image in the Massachusetts cases of Mellen v. Whipple and
Curtis v. Brown. See supra text accompanying notes 183-90.
216 See Witschard v. A Brody & Sons, 257 N.Y. 97, 99, 177 N.E. 385, 385 (1931);
Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 497, 502, 121 N.E. 362, 364 (1918).
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equivalent of S's undertaking than when it moves from C to S.217
It is striking that the exception in which the court tolerated a
collateral promise in the latter type of case in Brown v. Curtiss,2 8
in which S owed C a debt and C accepted a third-party note at
face value in payment. The underlying constant is that the
purpose of the statute is not implicated if S receives an
equivalent quid pro quo by which he becomes a principal debtor,
independently of D's liability.
V. Two LOOSE ENDS
I have attempted to analyze some typical suretyship
situations in light of precedent and policy. There is one further
situation that seems correct but is hard to classify with other
precedents; and one that is not only hard to classify, but of
doubtful soundness.
A. The Del Credere Agent
A seller may be unfamiliar with a distant market and the
reliability of numerous traders there. The seller contracts with a
local agent and empowers him to sell goods on credit to persons
selected by the agent, and the agent orally guarantees payment
for goods sold. In consideration of his added responsibility, the
agent receives an enhanced commission. In conformity with the
common law consensus,2 9 New York220 and Massachusetts 22' hold
the agent's oral promise binding. Various reasons have been
assigned for this result, but the Restatement view is that "an
important inducement for the promise is his desire to advance
his own interest. '222  This is an acceptable explanation in
217 See 1 WILLISTON, supra note 86, § 476. The manifest equivalence in values in
Cardell v. McNiel, 21 N.Y. 336 (1860) undoubtedly clinched the conclusion that S
was promising to pay his own debt to C.
21" 2 N.Y. 225 (1849). One would also include Cardell, in which C accepted a
third-party note at face value from S in payment for a horse. Cardell, 21 N.Y. at 337.
The extension of these cases to the sale of a third-party note in Milks v. Rich, 80
N.Y. 269 (1880) is less persuasive.
219 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 6.3.
220 See Sherwood v. Stone, 14 N.Y. 267, 269 (1856); Wolff & Henricks v. Koppel,
5 Hill 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), affd, 2 Denio 368 (N.Y. 1845).
221 See Swan v. Nesmith, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 220, 223-24 (1828).
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 121(2) cmt. a (1981); accord
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(g) cmt. q (1996); 1
WILLISTON, supra note 86, § 484 (opining that the promise is withdrawn from the
statute "only because the transaction on both sides is concerned with a matter to
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jurisdictions comfortable with a loose version of the main purpose
rule. But it is hardly satisfactory in New York. If the result is to
be reconciled with the overall case law in New York, one would
hope to find an explanation that constitutes the agent as a
principal debtor, independent of the customers' indebtedness. In
Sherwood v. Stone,223 the court attempted to constitute the agent
as a purchaser of the debt from the principal independent of the
customer. This suffered from the slight difficulty that it was not
in accord with the facts. Earlier, Justice Cowen recognized that
the agent's promise was collateral to that of the customer, but
put forward an ingenious analogy: "Suppose a factor agrees by
parol to sell for cash, but gives a credit. His promise is virtually
that he will pay the amount of the debt he thus makes. Yet who
would say his promise is within the statute? ' 224  The Justice
appears to say that a business objective that could be
accomplished by one lawful means justifies any other means,
even if the latter means as such is barred by statute. Thus, the
agent becomes an original promisor by analogy.2 25
Professor Simpson, a good legal realist, cut through the
evasions and slight-of-hand characterizations:
The fact that the guarantor has a purpose of his own to promote
scarcely of itself justifies calling him a debtor, or denying that
he promises to answer for the debt of another. Nevertheless,
the well established view that the promise of a del credere agent
is not within the statute, though it appears to be within its
letter, is sound, because such a situation presents practically
none of the danger that spurious claims might be established by
perjured testimony that led to the passage of the statute.
Professor Simpson goes on to describe the circumstances of a
typical del credere agency and concludes, convincingly, that there
is less danger of fraud than in an ordinary action of debt where
which the guaranty is a mere incident"). The same might be said of many cases
where the courts have applied the statute. See 2 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 389(stressing that the leading object of the agent is to make larger commissions from
sales to strangers, so that "he is an insurer and not a surety"). This description fits
many professional compensated sureties as to whom the statute applies. Id. § 371.223 Sherwood, 14 N.Y. at 267.
224 Wolff & Henricks, 5 Hill at 460.
225 In addressing a similar argument, Chief Judge Cardozo observed: "The form
of the transaction was not thoughtless or accidental .... The quality impressed at
the beginning persists until the end." Wayne County Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co.,
244 N.Y. 351, 353, 155 N.E. 669, 669 (1927).
[Vol. 79:319
2005] SURETYSHIP STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTIONS 367
the goods are delivered to a designee of the buyer.226 Professor
Simpson's explanation accords with the testimony of experience.
Such an arrangement has proven over many years to be a useful
way of doing business.227  If this explanation lacks logical
symmetry with other legal principles of suretyship law in New
York, it may be that the main purpose rule has a tiny part of its
nose in the tent. Chief Judge Cardozo reminded us in another
context: "As in the case of other concepts,...the pressure of
exceptions has led to irregularities of form. 228
B. Rosenkranz v. Schreiber Brewing Co.
There is one New York Court of Appeals case that eludes my
ability to place it in some satisfactory category. In Rosenkranz v.
Schreiber Brewing Co., 229 C, a builder, contracted with D to
renovate D's property. This was done at the urging of S, who
orally assured C not to worry about payment because he was
advancing money to D to take care of paying C. Apparently
attempting to come within the line of cases described in Part I,
the plaintiffs agent testified that based on what the defendant's
agent said, he "inferred" that plaintiff could look solely to
defendant for payment. C won in the trial court. The judgment
was reversed in the Appellate Division, whose opinion refers to
the lack of legally sufficient evidence to justify defendant's
"inference" that he looked solely to S for payment. The Court of
Appeals in turn reversed the Appellate Division and held the
statute inapplicable. If the Court of Appeals had simply based its
reversal on the ground that there was enough evidence to make
plaintiffs "inference" a jury question, the decision would be
unexceptionable in principle, if dubious on the facts. The Court
of Appeals did indeed reverse because it found a jury question,
but not the one referred to. The critical factual issue, in the view
of that court, was whether the evidence supported a finding that
the defendant promised "to indemnify the plaintiff against a
226 See SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 163-64.
227 Most recently, the del credere technique has been used by commodities
brokerage firms in relation to their account representatives; customer deficits are
deducted from commissions payable. See Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Haltmier, 67
A.D.2d 480, 481, 416 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (2d Dep't 1979).
228 Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 375, 159
N.E. 173, 175 (1927).
229 287 N.Y. 322, 39 N.E.2d 257 (1942).
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default of Edgewater Island Park, Inc. [D], or was a special
promise to answer for such a default and hence was within the
statute of frauds." 3' That was held to be a question of fact for
the jury, whose verdict was reinstated.
It is respectfully submitted that the court's distinction is
without substance. A promise to "indemnify" against a debtor's
default and a "promise to answer for such a default" are
substantially identical. There is no magic in the word
"indemnify." It all depends on what risk of loss the promise
addresses.23' Many types of loss occur without anyone being
legally responsible. Fire and collision insurance are illustrations.
Yes, some fires and some damages are caused by careless
tortfeasors, but many are not; and the indemnitor promises to
make good the loss regardless of the liability of any third person.
The indemnitor's right to subrogate to the victim's tort claim in a
particular case 232 does not retroactively convert the absolute
promise of indemnity to the collateral one of suretyship.233 But
230 Id. at 325, 39 N.E.2d at 257.
231 See Perkins v. Littlefield, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 370 (1862); Gen. Phoerix Corp.
v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 93, 89 N.E.2d 238, 241 (1949). A surety was long ago defined
as one who promises "to indemnify against a future default or liability of such
principal debtor." Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114, 121 (N.Y. 1834). One
controversial issue is whether S's oral promise to indemnify C for becoming surety
for D's obligation to a fourth party violates the statute. Most cases enforce the
promise on the ground that the promissee is an obligor, not an obligee. See Aldrich v.
Ames, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 76, 77 (1857); Chapin v. Lapham, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 467,
470 (1838); Tighe v. Morrison, 116 N.Y. 263, 269, 22 N.E. 164, 166 (1889); Chapin v.
Merrill, 4 Wend. 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
118 (1981); cf. Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N.Y. 250 (1874). It may be objected that if D
is under a duty to exonerate or reimburse C, then S's oral promise is collateral to
that duty. Some authorities would apply the statute. See 1 WILLISTON, supra note
86, § 482. However, if D did not request C to be his surety, and C signed at the
urging of S (and the fourth-party creditor) only, D has no implied duty to save C
harmless. SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 201. In this situation, C's only right is to be
subrogated to the creditor's right against D. Id. at 209. The cases holding the statute
applicable do not seem to notice this distinction. See Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts of
Indemnity and the Statute of Frauds, 41 HARV. L. REV. 689, 705-06 (1928).
232 The insurer's right arises from the equities of the situation and requires no
contract. Hall & Long v. R.R. Cos., 80 U.S. 367 (1872); Hart v. W. R.R., 54 Mass. (13
Met.) 99 (1847); Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry. Co., 73 N.Y. 399 (1878); Aetna Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385 (N.Y. 1836).
233 New York and Massachusetts enforce oral insurance contracts. See Sanborn
v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 448, 452-53 (1860); Ellis v. Albany City
Fire Ins. Co., 50 N.Y. 402, 405 (1872); First Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co.,
19 N.Y. 305, 307 (1859); see also Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Hooker
Electrochemical Co., 240 N.Y. 37, 147 N.E. 351 (1925); WILLIAM R. VANCE,
INSURANCE § 36 (3d ed. 1951).
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where the only loss indemnified against is a specific debtor's
default, as in Rosenkranz, indemnity and suretyship become
one.
234
A comment on Rosenkranz by the Court of Appeals in a later
case suggests that a distinction between suretyship and
indemnity lies in the lack of a principal debtor at the time the
defendant's promise is made. 235 This is no more persuasive than
what was said in Rosenkranz. While the delayed appearance of a
principal debtor may occur in legitimate indemnity cases, such as
fire insurance, it is also true in routine suretyship cases as
well.236 If S says to C, "sell goods on credit to D and I guarantee
you will be paid," the promise is bad without a writing even
though the principal debt is not incurred until after the surety's
promise.237 It cannot be the law that if S says to C, "sell goods on
credit to D and I will indemnify you against possible default," the
court would hold D's oral promise binding. 238 As Judge Pound
said of the statute in Richardson Press, "its efficacy should not be
wasted by unsubstantial verbal distinctions. 239
The late Professor John D. Calamari understood Rosenkranz
to mean that where S's promise is contemporaneous with D's
indebtedness to C, the out-of-state main purpose rule applies and
New York law does not require that S come "under an
independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the
234 Accord Conway, supra note 120, at 144. According to Professor Conway, the
record in Rosenkranz disclosed that S was a brewer, and its promise to pay for the
installation of a bar for D was to provide an outlet for sales of S's beer. Corbin sets
forth a "main purpose" notion of indemnity that would include credit insurance.
Because the insurer is a total stranger to the potential obligors, and the undertaking
is not for their benefit, the promisor is not a surety. 2 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 388.
Contra 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 482. Even under the Corbin view,
Rosenkranz was a suretyship contract.
215 Bulkley v. Shaw, 289 N.Y. 133, 140, 44 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1942).
236 4 CORBIN & BROWN, supra note 9, §§ 15.4-.5. In New York, the Appellate
Division held that a father's oral promise to pay for his daughter's hospital care had
to be original because it was made before the daughter had incurred any debt to the
hospital. Four Winds Hosp. v. Keasbey, 92 A.D.2d 478, 479-80, 459 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-
70 (1st Dep't 1983), modified, 59 N.Y.2d 943, 453 N.E.2d 529, 466 N.Y.S.2d 300
(1983). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a question of fact was presented
whether the father was a surety.
237 See, e.g., Carville v. Crane, 5 Hill 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Jones v. Cooper,
98 Eng. Rep. 1058 (K.B. 1774). See generally 4 CORBIN & BROWN, supra note 9, §
15.5.
238 See Alber-Wickes Platform Serv. v. Freiburg Passion Play in English, Inc.,
141 Misc. 480, 483, 252 N.Y.S. 209, 212 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1931).
239 Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 497, 502, 121 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1918).
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principal debtor,"24 as required by White v. Rintoul.24' It is quite
true that Judge Finch's synthesis in that case was expressly
applied to cases where the primary debt "was antecedently
contracted.242 But that was simply because the facts of the case
before him, as well as the cases he reviewed, all involved debts
antecedently contracted. That does not entail the conclusion that
the out-of-state main purpose rule applies where D's debt to C is
incurred at the same time as S's promise to C. Neither the New
York nor the Massachusetts cases support that interpretation.
The cases, addressed in Part I of this Article, did not look to the
reason for S's promise or what self-interest he was promoting.
The rule of those cases was that S's promise was outside the
statute only if he was the sole obligor and no credit whatsoever
was given to D.243  It would have been superfluous for Judge
Finch to have incorporated this class of cases in his synthesis.
There is no one whose liability is more clearly independent of
anyone else than a person who is the sole obligor. Indeed, Judge
Finch's formula, as applied where D's debt was contracted prior
to S's promise, brings those cases into perfect harmony with the
rule applied to the cases where there is a single transaction.244
The latter class of cases would have to be overruled to let the
main purpose rule creep in that door, and if so, there would be no
point in not applying it as well to cases where D's debt was
antecedently contracted. Whatever the merits of Rosenkranz, it
240 John D. Calamari, The Suretyship Statute of Frauds, 27 FORDHAM L. REV.
332, 343 (1958).
241 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).
242 Id. at 227, 15 N.E. at 320.
243 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The recent case of Capital Knitting
Mills, Inc. v. Duofold, Inc., 131 A.D.2d 87, 519 N.Y.S.2d 968 (lst Dep't 1987) would
have been decided differently under Professor Calamari's rule. C supplied specialty
cloth under contract with D, which in turn manufactured it into garments for S. D's
credit was questionable and C refused to sign with D until S orally guaranteed
payment. S's self-interest is manifest, yet the court held that the promise violated
the statute: C gave credit to D and S's promise was collateral. The court applied the
New York rule but was not happy with it and invited the Court of Appeals to revisit
the issue.
244 As long ago as Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412 (1860), the court insisted that:
[T]he statute [makes] no distinction between a debt created at the time
when the collateral engagement is made, and one having a previous
existence.... [I]n either case, and equally in both, the inquiry under that
statute is, whether there be a debtor and a surety, and not when the
relation was created.
Id. at 415; accord Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114, 121 (N.Y. 1834).
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did not overthrow prior precedents and has been little noticed in
subsequent cases.
One possible rationale for Rosenkranz is that S's promise
was not directly to answer for the debt of D. S promised to
advance funds to D to enable D to pay its debt to C. In the
relationship between principal and surety, the performance by
either will discharge both duties. As Corbin stated, "If the
performance promised by the two persons are different and full
performance by either of them would not discharge the other,
neither one is a surety and the statute does not apply. '245  In
Rosenkranz, if S kept his promise to advance funds to D, that
would not satisfy D's duty to pay C. True, it would facilitate
performance of that duty, but that is a different thing.2 46 It may
be that the court's reference to the possibility that S promised to
"indemnify the plaintiff against a default" of D was an obscure
way of expressing this idea. However, in Bulkley v. Shaw,247
decided the same year as Rosenkranz, a promise to put the debtor
in funds was regarded as coming within the statute, without
discussion. There the matter must rest.
CONCLUSION
The heading of a capstone section of Williston's treatise
reads: "True Test Should Be: Is the New Promisor a Surety?
248
In the explanation that follows, Williston makes it clear what he
means by a surety: "If, as between himself and the original
245 2 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 349; see also 4 CORBIN & BROWN, supra note 9, §
15.19.
246 But see, e.g., D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 26 U.S. 476, 500 (1828); Towne v. Grover, 26
Mass. (9 Pick.) 306, 307 (1830); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY
§ 1 illus. 14 (1996) (suggesting that S was not a surety).
247 289 N.Y. 133, 138, 44 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1942). Defendants, controlling
shareholders of a publishing corporation, promised a vendor, Bulkley, that they
would fund the corporation if he would continue to sell paper on credit to it.
Interestingly, the court recognized the difference between the promises of D and S:
"The italicized portions of the contract... show quite clearly that the defendants
never promised to pay Bulkley any sum. Their promise was to put Review in funds
to meet its obligations." Id. at 136, 44 N.E.2d at 400. The court did not pursue the
implications of this sentence and held the promise void under the statute. If S
promises D to advance funds to enable it to pay C for some work, the promise is not
within the statute, but catch 22, C is not an intended beneficiary. Tomaso, Feitner &
Land, Inc. v. Brown, 4 N.Y.2d 391, 393, 151 N.E.2d 221, 222, 175 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74
(1958). Because Bulkley involved a promise directly to the creditor, there was no
problem with third-party beneficiaries.
248 3 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 475, at 447.
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promisor, the debt really ought to be paid by the latter, whatever
may be the other elements of the transaction, the new promisor
is on principle and in fact promising to answer for the debt or
default of another., 24
9
Williston admits that his theory leaves out cases where the
defendant promisor received a quid pro quo from the creditor and
thus became a principal debtor °.2 " As seen in Cardell v. McNiel,
if S pays his debt to C with D's note, S's oral guarantee is
enforced, yet as between S and D the latter ought to pay.25' In
Fish v. Thomas, the boat owner's promise is enforced, yet as
between the owner of the boat and the builder who incurred the
debt, the builder ought to pay.252 A rationale that fails to account
for these cases is not satisfactory.
If we can admit that indebtedness and suretyship can
coexist, that a person can wear two hats-as a principal debtor to
C and, at the same time, a surety for D-then we can see our way
clear to a comprehensive interpretation of the statute: it applies
only to promisors who occupy suretyship status as to both C and
D. Such would be the case in Fish v. Thomas, if S, the owner of
the encumbered property, had promised C to "guarantee" D's
debt. 53 On the other hand, if S's dealings with either D or C
make him primarily liable to the party dealt with, then the
statute does not apply. The line of cases typified by First
National Bank of Sing Sing v. Chalmers show S taking D's debt
upon himself by a transaction with D; thus S's subsequent
promise to C to pay D's debt is at the same time a promise to pay
his own debt. 254  Fish,255 Cardel1256 and kindred cases show S
taking an original debt upon himself in a transaction with C.
Perhaps we can say that in these cases, S's status as a debtor to
C trumps his status as a surety for D.
249 Id. § 475.
250 Id. at § 475.
251 21 N.Y. 336, 337-39 (1860).
252 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 45, 48 (1855).
253 Such a promise would make S a surety as to both C and D, and the statute
would apply. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
254 144 N.Y. 432, 434, 39 N.E. 331, 331 (1895); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(b) cmt. h (1996) (acknowledging that in the
situation described in the text, S has suretyship status and is also answering for his
own debt).
255 71 Mass. (5 Gray.) at 48.
256 21 N.Y. at 337-39.
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This explanation fits comfortably within the famous
summary statement in White v. Rintoul:
[W]here the primary debt subsists and was antecedently
contracted, the promise to pay it is original when it is founded
on a new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to
him, and such that the promisor thereby comes under an
independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the
principal debtor.
7
This summary is quite open textured, but it clearly does not
focus on whether S is a surety; it focuses on whether S is a debtor
to C independently of D's liability. Where D has given
consideration to S in exchange for S's promise to pay the debt,
then as between S andoD, S has made himself primarily
responsible and his subsequent promise to C fits the Rintoul test.
Where the seller of a horse accepts an orally guaranteed note
from S in payment, the form of the promise may be collateral, but
it is for a debt independent of the liability of the maker of the
note. If the facts of any case show that S has "made the debt his
own" vis-a-vis either C or D, the Rintoul test is satisfied. 8
One of Williston's most insightful observations concerned a
basic distinction not always observed by courts: "That distinction
is between a consideration which is given and received as the
equivalent of the debt, payment of which is promised; and, on the
other hand, a consideration which is given merely as the
equivalent for the risk which the promisor may run in being
compelled to pay." '259 Somewhere in the middle of Williston's
dichotomy lie cases where the consideration for S's promise is
discounted by the risk of D's nonpayment. A particularly difficult
issue is presented by cases in which the consideration moves
from C to S, but does not fully match the scope of S's
undertaking. Assume C has delivered lumber worth $100 under
a contract with D, who is building a house for S. D has not paid
for the lumber and C justifiably refuses to deliver more. S says
to C, "Forget about D. You and I can make a new contract. You
257 108 N.Y. 222, 227, 15 N.E. 318, 320 (1888).
258 Cardell did not involve a debt "antecedently contracted," at least not between
C and D. Prior to S's promise, the debt was owed by D to S. S assigned it to C with a
guarantee as payment for a horse purchased from C. Nevertheless, the result is in
harmony with the Rintoul dictum. See Cardell, 21 N.Y. at 337-39.
259 1 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 46, § 473. This point is noticed in
Rolfsmeyer v. Rau, 269 N.W. 411, 413 (Minn. 1936).
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continue to deliver lumber to the site and I'll pay you for all
lumber delivered." C accepts this offer and delivers an additional
$100 worth of lumber. May C recover $200 from S? Cases from
Massachusetts and New York formerly said no, but recent cases
have said yes.260  This result is not directly inconsistent with
Brown v. Weber26' and Witschard v. A. Brody & Sons.262 In those
cases, S's promise was to "guarantee" D's debt for past and future
work done by C for D. C continued to perform the contract with
D. There was no new contract between C and S, bypassing D.
Here, there is such a new contract. C is no longer dealing with
D; he is dealing with S. However, it is most unlikely that C and
S intended that C could collect $200 from S and $100 from D.
Therefore, if S pays C $200 he subrogates to C's claim against D
for $100.263 This indicates that S is a surety for D to the extent of
$100. Thus, as to past indebtedness of D to C, the form of S's
promise does not escape the strictures of Brown and Witschard.
This is apparent from Pfeiffer v. Adler,26 in which S's promise to
pay for goods to be sold to her by C included an absolute promise
to pay a debt for goods previously sold to her late husband. The
only consideration was C's continued sale of goods on credit to S
at market price. The promise to pay the past debt was held void.
A dishonest creditor can just as easily testify to the conversation
quoted above as to a promise by S to "guarantee" that D will pay.
The facts may be cloudy as to D's role thereafter. Is it a wise
interpretation of the statute to allow the result to depend so
heavily on the words testified to? If C's recovery were limited to
the price of goods delivered or work done in response to S's
absolute promise, the danger of fraud is minimized in that S has
received an equivalent quid pro quo. But if S's promise can
incorporate past due debts of D to C, S is exposed to liability for
which he has not received equivalent consideration.
I have said above that S can wear two hats: he may be a
260 Hayes v. Guy, 205 N.E.2d 699, 700 (Mass. 1965); Brown Bros. Elec.
Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 399, 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001,
393 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (1977). The Hayes case faced the issue squarely and gave brief
reasons for its conclusion based on the main purpose rule. Whether those brief
reasons are satisfactory is a different question. The Brown Bros. decision was far
less explicit and did not betray awareness that it was departing from prior law.
261 38 N.Y. 187, 191-92 (1868).
262 257 N.Y. 97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931).
263 See 2 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 366, at 277; SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 206.
264 37 N.Y. 164 (1867).
[Vol. 79:319
2005] SURETYSHIP STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTIONS 375
debtor to C and at the same time a surety for D. But the
indebtedness must exist independently of S's promise to C.265 To
say this requirement is met here would require a court to believe
that the parties agreed that the consideration provided by C-the
lumber delivered after the promise-made S a debtor to the tune
of $200, so S was really promising to pay his own debt to C. This
strains credulity to the breaking point.266 S promised C to pay
$200, not because that was the agreed price of lumber thereafter
delivered, but because the consequential damages that would be
caused by C's withholding delivery outweighed in S's mind the
burden of paying D's debt, which might be small in comparison.
S's promise cannot be forced into the mold of Rintoul;267 S is not
promising to pay a debt of his own that exists independently of
his promise to C, as would be required under the traditional New
York rule.268  If the promise is to be enforced, it can only be
because it was S's leading object to benefit himself, not to
accommodate D. If this is now the law in New York, the main
purpose rule has more than its nose in the tent; the rest of the
animal has crept in unnoticed.
Of course, the doctrine developed in New York is different in
form from the main purpose rule found in Massachusetts law.
But where the benefit flows from C to S, many cases similar on
their facts have been decided the same way in both jurisdictions;
at least until recently, there have been few differences in actual
265 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 11(3)(b)(ii) cmt. h
(1996).
266 2 WILLISTON, supra note 86, § 684, at 1321.
267 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).
268 Pfeiffer, 37 N.Y. at 164; accord Winne v. Mehrbach, 130 A.D. 329, 114 N.Y.S.
618 (3d Dep't 1909); Cardeza v. Bishop, 54 A.D. 116, 117, 66 N.Y.S. 408, 408 (2d
Dep't 1900). Paradoxically, in New York, C's case against S might be stronger if C
was not justified in canceling the prior contract with D. If C was a subcontractor
providing services, such a contract is always held to be entire. New Era Homes Corp.
v. Forster, 299 N.Y. 303, 306-07, 86 N.E.2d 757, 758-59 (1949). In New York, that
means that if C quit without good cause, he has no claim against D. Steel Storage &
Elevator Constr. Co. v. Stock, 225 N.Y. 173, 176, 121 N.E. 786, 786-87 (1919); Triple
M. Roofing Corp. v. Greater Jericho Corp., 43 A.D.2d 594, 594, 349 N.Y.S.2d 771,
773 (2d Dep't 1973). If D owes nothing to C, S's new promise cannot be collateral. See
Manetti v. Doege, 48 A.D. 567, 568-69, 62 N.Y.S. 918, 919 (2d Dep't 1900); Devlin v.
Woodgate, 34 Barb. 252, 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1861); accord
Buchanan v. Moran, 25 A. 396, 397-98 (Conn. 1892). However, if C was delivering
goods to D, the contract of sale is undoubtedly divisible. C has a vested right to
payment for goods delivered despite his later breach. See U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (2002);
Tipton v. Feitner, 20 N.Y. 423, 427 (1859); see also supra notes 159-60 and
accompanying text.
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results. Seventy years ago, the Supreme Judicial Court
undertook a major review of the case law and limited some prior
loose statements of the rule, confining it to S's acquisition of such
a direct and substantial benefit from C that the debt may fairly
be said to be his own.269 This strict version of the rule brought it
into close proximity to the New York position. The
Massachusetts cases since that time have chipped away at the
statute piecemeal and enlarged the exception, not always with
attention to precedent. There is now a large area of uncertainty.
A new synthesis would be welcome.
In contrast, where the benefit flows from D to S, who in
exchange agrees to pay D's debt, the Court of Appeals has
enforced S's oral promise to C, while the Supreme Judicial Court
has, thus far, refused to do so, although the demise of Mellen v.
Whipple210 may one day bring about a change. Until such a
change comes, it appears that New York is more generous to
creditors seeking to deny promisors the protection of the statute.
This may come as a surprise to those who assume that the
Massachusetts rule is always more permissive than the rule in
New York.
By and large, New York has been faithful to the standards
laid down in the earlier cases, but recently has shown signs of
straying from the well-trodden path.271  The way the statute is
interpreted may be at a crossroads. The Court of Appeals will
have to decide whether to strike out in a new untried direction,272
perhaps toward a more perfect justice, or not, or else return to
the strait and narrow way laid down in the cases summarized in
Part III.C.
269 Colpitts v. L.C. Fisher Co., 193 N.E. 833, 834 (Mass. 1935), see also supra
notes 192-94 and accompanying text (examining the nature of the benefit and the
promisor's relation to it). In referring to the building construction cases, the court
cited with approval not only Gill v. Herrick, 111 Mass. 501 (1873) and Collins v.
Abrams, 176 N.E. 814 (Mass. 1931), but also Witschard v. A. Brody & Sons, 257 N.Y.
97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931). However, the court also apparently approved the landlord-
tenant case of Washington & Devonshire Realty Co. v. Lewis Diamond Co., 161 N.E.
883 (Mass. 1928).
270 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854).
271 See Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d
397, 361 N.E.2d 999, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1977); see also Pyramid Champlain Co. v.
R.P. Brosseau & Co., 267 A.D.2d 539, 543-44, 699 N.Y.S.2d 516, 521 (3d Dep't 1999).
272 Such a change was suggested in Capital Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Duofold, Inc.,
131 A.D.2d 87, 95, 519 N.Y.S.2d 968, 972-73 (1st Dep't 1987).
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